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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT
All parties to the product liability action pending in the
United States District Court are identified in the caption above.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction over the questions of state law certified by the
United States District Court for the District of Utah is conferred
upon

the

Supreme

Court

Constitution of Utah.

of Utah

by Article

VIII,

§3

of the

The District Court's Certification Order is

dated December 19, 1990, and this Court accepted the certified
questions by Order dated January 3, 1991.

By Order dated January

23, 1991, this Court entered a Certification Order pursuant to Rule
41(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure accepting specific
certified questions for consideration, designating the record on
appeal for this matter and establishing procedures and times for
the parties' submissions of briefs and oral argument.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The certified questions from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah accepted for consideration are:
1.

Whether

Utah

adopts

the

"unavoidably

unsafe products"

exception to strict products liability as set forth in Comment k to
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)?
Subquestion A: If Utah does adopt Comment k, should FDA
approved prescription drugs be deemed as a matter of law to have
satisfied the "unavoidably unsafe" prerequisite to the Comment k
exception, or should that determination be made on a case by case
basis?
Subquestion B: If Utah does adopt Comment k, and if it is
further

determined

that

its

application

to

FDA

approved

prescription drugs ought to be made on a case by case basis, is
such determination a threshold question for the trial court, or a
question properly to be presented to the jury?
Subquestion C: If it is determined that Comment k is to
be applied to FDA approved prescription drugs on a case by case
basis, is evidence pertaining to adverse side-effects from the drug
which were are (sic) not alleged to have been personally suffered
by

the

plaintiff

relevant

to

the

"unavoidably

unsafe"

determination?
The standard of review for certified questions is de novo as
to the issues of law with deference given to the District Court's
factual determinations.

Simon v. G.D.Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397

(8th Cir.1987).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES & REGULATIONS
It is anticipated that Upjohn will continue to rely upon
certain present and former provisions of the Utah Code relating to
product liability and punitive damages, to wit, Utah Code Ann. §7818-2 and 78-15-1 et seq., referenced in defendant's Reply Brief in
Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in the United
States District Court.

(See Record on Appeal at pp. 186-188,

hereinafter

-

"Rec.pp

.")

As

such

statutes

are

not

determinative,they have been reproduced in the body of this brief,
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(f)(2).
statutory

and

constitutional

provisions

reproduced in the body of this brief.

at

issue

are

Other
also

Pursuant to Utah Rule of

Appellate Procedure 24(f)(1), the District Court's Certification
Order, with attachment, thereto, is reproduced in an addendum to
this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 6, 1990, Upjohn filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Plaintiffs' Strict Liability Claims

in the United

States District Court contending that Comment k, the "unavoidably
unsafe" product exception to the doctrine
established by the Restatement

of strict liability

(Second) of Torts, Section 402A,

applied to all prescription drugs as a matter of law, including
Halcion, regardless of whether the drug products could be made
safer and notwithstanding the availability of safer alternatives.
(Rec. p.31)

Based thereon, Upjohn asserted that the doctrine of

strict tort liability is unavailable, as a matter of law, to any
person

injured

by

a

pharmaceutical product.

defective

and

unreasonably

dangerous

Plaintiffs' Response and Memorandum in

Opposition to that motion was filed on April 24, 1990.

(Rec.p.87)

Upjohn mailed its reply to plaintiffs7 counsel on Friday, May 4,
1990, so that the reply was received less than 24 hours before
scheduled oral argument.
On May 8, 1990, oral argument was heard before the Honorable
David K. Winder, United States District Judge, and the issues were
taken under advisement.

When Judge Winder's daughter accepted an

offer of employment from Upjohn, Judge Winder sua sponte recused
himself from this action, and the case was reassigned to the
Honorable J. Thomas Greene.

No further briefing was submitted by

the parties, and Judge Greene heard oral argument on defendant's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on August 28, 1990, along with
several other pending motions and matters.

The strict liability

issue was taken under advisement.
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By Order dated December
questions

arising

19, 1990, Judge Greene certified

from defendant's Motion

for Partial

Summary

Judgment on Plaintiffs' Strict Liability Claims to this Honorable
Court and requested acceptance of these questions on an expedited
schedule for the filing of briefs and oral argument, as a six-week
jury trial in this case is scheduled to commence on April 29, 1991.
Initial acceptance of the certified questions was made by an order
and notice on the clerk of The Supreme Court of Utah dated January
3, 1991.
During a hearing held before Judge Greene on January 11, 1991,
and again during the course of the two day trial of Upjohn's
copyright action on January 16 and 17, 1991, Judge Greene addressed
the

procedures

including

for

expedited

consideration

of

consideration

the

certified

thereof,

composition of the record on appeal.

as

questions,

well

as

the

Judge Greene requested and

received the parties' input as to the composition of the record on
appeal, and the agreed upon record with United States District
Court docket numbers was transmitted to the Supreme Court under
memo dated January 18, 1991, which record was accepted by this
Court's Order of January 23, 1991.1

By Order of the United States

1 Upjohn had initially expressed a desire to expand the record on
appeal to include matters which were not presented to the District
Court. In response, Judge Greene noted that if other such matters
were necessary and appropriate for consideration, they should have
been submitted to the District Court for consideration at the
appropriate time.
Thereafter, Judge Greene proposed the
composition of the record on appeal, and there was neither
objection nor request to supplement.
Pursuant to Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 41(e), the record on appeal is established and
closed. Should Upjohn now, notwithstanding its acceptance of the
record on appeal, attempt to submit materials not presented to the
District Court, such materials and arguments based thereon such
argument should be disregarded and stricken.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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District Court dated February 1, 1991, the record on appeal was
corrected to reflect the erroneous exclusion of one exhibit and the
erroneous transmittal of certain other exhibits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As the District Court has already provided a statement of
facts for this Court's consideration, only the following brief
summary is required.
This drug product liability action arises from the death of
Mildred Lucille Coates on June 19, 1988, with liability of the
defendant, The Upjohn Company (hereinafter "defendant11 or "Upjohn")
predicated upon negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty
and other theories of law.

(Complaint filed 24th day of March,

1989 in the United States District Court, District of Utah, Rec. pp
1-2 0)

The action is brought by Ilo Marie Grundberg, on behalf of

herself, and by Janice Gray, as personal representative of the
estate of Mildred Lucille Coates, deceased.
Grundberg's

use

of

defendant

Upjohn7s

The action arises from
drug

product,

Halcion

(generic name "triazolam"), a sleeping pill, of which there are and
were

on

June

alternatives

19, 1988, other

on

the market.

available, effective
Plaintiffs

allege

and

safer

that many of

Halcion,s adverse side effects arise from its actions on the user's
central nervous system and manifest themselves in a panoply of
psychiatric

effects

including

severe

depression,

psychosis,

depersonalization, paranoia, hallucinations, aggressive assaultive
behavior and homicidal compulsion.

(Rec. pp. 6 & 8)

Plaintiffs' allegations include that Halcion is defectively
designed.

Plaintiffs7 further allege that Upjohn concealed and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

misrepresented data regarding these and other adverse side effects
in the presentation of its new drug application for Halcion to the
Food and Drug Administration

("FDA") , that it was marketed in a

dangerously excessive dosage, overpromoted, inadequately designed,
tested and inspected and was accompanied by inadequate warnings.
(Rec. pp.6 & 10)

This action therefore directly involves a drug

not properly marketed by Upjohn.
injured

as

a

consequence

of

Plaintiffs allege that they were

Ilo

Grundberg's

ingestion

of

the

defective product Halcion.
On

June

19,

1988,

Mrs.

Grundberg,

in

accordance

with

a

prescription by her physician, consistent with Upjohn's recoitimended
dosage, took a .5 milligram dose of Halcion.
Halcion

in accordance with

her

She had been using

physician's

conformity with Upjohn's recommendations.

instructions

and

in

Mrs. Grundberg, however,

fell under Halcion induced intoxication, suffered central nervous
system

reactions

to

triazolam

which

were

known

to

Upjohn

and

fatally shot her 83 year old mother, Mildred Lucille Coates.2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This Court should not adopt the unavoidably unsafe products
exception to strict products liability as set forth in Comment k to
Section 402A of the Restatement
instant

case

does

not

(Second) of Torts

present

the

Court

with

(1965).
a

The

situation

contemplated by the Comment in that Halcion, the prescription drug
at issue herein, is a sleeping pill which, according to the Food
and Drug Administration

(MFDAM) and the other evidence of record,

is neither unique, essential to the public welfare, nor superior to
2 Criminal charges brought against Mrs. Grundberg were dismissed
based upon the Halcion induced intoxication.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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existing, safer alternatives.

Further, Comment k is a restrictive

provision which undermines the important policies underlying the
doctrine of strict liability, i.e., shifting the burden of risk of
economic injury resulting from the use of a defective product from
the public, which is least able to shoulder that burden, to the
manufacturer

of the dangerous and defective product, which is

better able to eliminate the risks and apportion the costs.
Assuming

that

this

Court

determines

that

Comment

k

appropriately can be and should be adopted as the law of Utah, such
comment should be a limited exception to the black letter law
restated at Section 402A and should be available as an affirmative
defense on a case by case basis.

The overwhelming majority of

jurisdictions considering the applicability

of Comment k to a

strict products liability action involving prescription drugs which
ultimately have adopted that Comment have done so on this basis.
Courts in these jurisdictions have declined to adopt Comment k as
an exception which swallows the rule and have rejected arguments
similar to those made by Upjohn here.

Courts have examined the

policies underlying strict products liability and have concluded
that a selective application of Comment k furthers the interests of
society

and

more than

adequately protects the interests of the manufacturers.

The courts

have

of

encouraging

determined

that

better

and

compliance

safer

with

FDA

drugs

regulations

is not

dispositive of a prescription drug's safety or efficacy and that
state tort law complements rather than hinders the functioning of
the FDA.
injured

Strict tort liability provides a mechanism by which
citizens

may

seek

redress

for

damages

resulting

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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from

injection into the stream of commerce of avoidably unsafe drugs. A
blanket immunity for prescription drug manufacturers deprives such
citizens of an opportunity to show that such drugs are avoidably
unsafe, defective and unreasonably dangerous based entirely upon
their inclusion in a particular category.

The courts have examined

the language of Comment k and found it clear that the drafters of
the Restatement

intended that only some prescription drugs be

exempt from a strict products liability action and, in fact, that
the very exemption sought by Upjohn was proposed and rejected by
the American Law Institute.

In its statutory and common law, the

state of Utah and this Honorable Court have emphasized the same
policy considerations other jurisdictions have found determinative
of this issue.

Adopting Comment k as a limited exception to

Section 402A of the Restatement to be pleaded as an affirmative
defense and to be considered on a case by case basis is consistent
with the law of the Utah and the better reasoned cases reported
elsewhere.
Assuming that Comment k is adopted as a limited exception to
strict products

liability,

submitting

the

issue of whether a

prescription drug is unavoidably unsafe to a jury best comports
with

the

constitutional

and

statutory

law

of

Utah,

is most

consistent with the traditional fact-finding function of the jury
system and places Utah in accord with the better reasoned cases
reported in other jurisdictions.

That the issue of a prescription

drug product's relative safety goes to the jury does not preclude
Upjohn or any other drug manufacturer from moving for summary
judgment on that issue, in which situation the trial court could

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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consider whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact as
to the drug's safety.
Finally, if this Court adopts Comment k as a limited exception
to

strict

products

liability

to

be pleaded

and

proved

by a

manufacturer as an affirmative defense on a case by case basis and
if the unavoidably unsafe issue is to be submitted to the jury, or
even if such issue is left to the court, all evidence of adverse
drug reactions associated with the drug needs to be considered.
Concepts of due process and fundamental fairness require such a
rule since the manufacturer will present any and all evidence of
the risks and dangers associated with alternate products.

Also,

evidence of such adverse reactions will be admissible under a
theory of negligent design; thus, the jury will hear evidence of
same

in

any

event.

The

admissibility

of

such

evidence

is

particularly appropriate in the prescription drug context in which
the drug operates on the central nervous system and causes adverse
reactions which manifest themselves as psychiatric reactions along
a full spectrum.

Lastly, the legislature of the state of Utah has

at one time adopted a statute mandating the admissibility, during a
strict products liability trial, of evidence going to the risks,
hazards

and

product.

dangerous

propensities

of

an

allegedly

defective

Allowing an airing of such evidence best serves the

traditional concept embodied in American jurisprudence of an open
and public proceeding where decisions are reached based upon a full
consideration of all relevant facts.
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ARGUMENT
Question 1,

)

An
Affirmative
Defense
To
Strict
Liability,
To
Be
Proven
By
The
Manufacturer, For "Unavoidably Unsafe"
Products As Proposed By Comment k To
Section 402A Of The Restatement (Second)
Of Torts Would Add An Unrecognized Defense
Under Utah Law

In Hahn v. Armco Steel Co,, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), this
Court

adopted

Section

402A

of Restatement

(Second) of Torts,

recognizing and adopting the doctrine of strict product liability.
This

Court

held

that

strict

liability

is

imposed

upon

all

manufacturers of products for injuries caused through the product's
defectiveness and its unreasonably dangerous characteristics.

Such

adoption was based in part upon the clearly recognized public
policy, to wit, that the cost of havoc brought by defective
products should not be borne by those "who are powerless to protect
themselves".

Hahn 601 P.2d at 156.

In adopting Section 402A, this Court specifically considered
defenses to strict liability, as well as the comments to Section
402A.
liability

The

only

two

defenses

recognized

to

strict

products

in Hahn were misuse of the product by the user or

consumer, citing Comment g, as well as knowledge of the defect by
the user or consumer who is aware of the danger and yet who
unreasonably proceeds to make use of the product, i.e., assumption
of risk, citing Comment n to Section 402A.

Hahn, 601 P.2d at 158.

This Court considered the comments to 402A and yet chose to adopt
only two of those comments.
This Court's express consideration and adoption* of only those
two comments and the defenses contained therein evidence caution
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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against the unthinking acceptance and application of the comments
in the Restatement.

Such caution is particularly appropriate where

Comment k is concerned, for Comment k is in fact a restrictive
provision contrary to the express purposes and public policies
underlying the doctrine of strict liability, to wit, the safety of
the citizens of the state of Utah and the proper and appropriate
shoulders upon which to place the costs of injuries resulting from
products placed in commerce for the express purpose of amassing
wealth from those individuals subsequently injured and others who
use such products.

In Collins v. Eli Lilly Co. , 116 Wise.2d 166,

342 N.W.2d 37 (1984), cert, denied. 469 U.S. 826 (1984) the court
held:
Although we adopted sec. 402A in Dippel v.
Sciano, supra. we specifically declined to
accept or reject any of the comments,
[citation omitted] We have not adopted comment
k to sec. 402A, and we decline to do so in this
case.
We conclude that the rule embodied in
Comment k is too restrictive and, therefore,
not commensurate with strict products liability
law in Wisconsin.
Drug companies, like other sellers or
manufacturers, have a duty to produce and
market reasonably safe products. We recognize
that in some exigent circumstances it may be
necessary to place a drug on the market before
adequate testing can be done. Insofar as these
circumstances exist, we agree with the comment
that strict liability should not be imposed.
However, we find no exigent circumstances which
would excuse DES producers or marketers from
adequately testing DES before it was placed on
the market.
Although there was a societal
interest
in
preventing
miscarriages
in
pregnancy, alternative treatment was available,
and the problem did not approach epidemic
proportions. Even assuming there were exigent
circumstances in 1947 necessitating the use of
DES in pregnancy without adequate testing, an
additional ten years had elapsed by the time
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the plaintiff's mother took DES.
Thus, it
would appear the drug companies had sufficient
time to test DES thoroughly even if the
original need to place it on the market
foreclosed adequate testing at that time.
Accordingly, we hold that DES producers or
marketers may be held strictly liable if the
plaintiff
establishes
the
five
elements
specified earlier.
Collins, 116 Wise.2d at 197, 342 N.W.2d at 52.3 (emphasis added)
Perhaps

this

Court

will

wish

to

consider

potential

applicability of Comment k when a truly exceptional, desirable and
socially necessary life-saving product is at issue.

In the present

case, however, under the facts as presented and found by the
District Court, such consideration is inappropriate.

Upjohn cannot

and does not dispute that the record is fraught with factual
questions as to whether safer alternative sleeping pills existed on
the market at the time Halcion caused the death of Mildred Lucille
Coates.

(Certification Order p.5)

This case involves a sleeping

pill which even the FDA found to be neither unique nor particularly
essential

(Rec. at p. 127,

Ex."B,f to Plaintiffs' Response and

Memorandum) and which it has classified as presenting no advance
over existing therapeutic alternatives. (Rec. p.92) Such a case
presents an inappropriate scenario for this Court's consideration
of the potential applicability of Comment k as a new affirmative
defense to strict liability in Utah.
Comment k was formulated to provide a limited exception to a
manufacturer's strict liability for those truly essential products
which were in fact unavoidably unsafe yet essential to the public
3 Upjohn's counsel in the present case argued the Collins case to
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, yet neglected to mention this
decision in its initial brief to the District Court.
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welfare.

The public policy and the societal interests underlying

strict liability, as found by this Court in Hahn, supra, ensure
that

the

costs

of

any

defect

are borne

by

the

manufacturer

receiving the profit from the sale rather than from those members
of the public receiving the injuries.

This Court has previously

considered the comments to Sec. 402A and determined that only two
of

those

comments

enunciate

legitimate

defenses

to

a

strict

liability claim brought and prosecuted under the law of Utah.
Hahn, supra.

,

Adherence to prior precedent and to the prevailing

public policies recognized by this Court clearly support Utah's
rejection of Comment k in its entirety, particularly in light of
the factual record before this Court.

If this Court were to adopt

Comment k, however, the express provisions of that Comment prohibit
the application espoused by Upjohn.

It is essential to recognize

that Upjohn, in actuality, does not urge this Court to adopt
Comment k as written.

Rather, Upjohn asserts that Utah should

grant blanket

from strict

manufacturers.

immunity

liability

to one class of

That is clearly not an adoption of Comment k to

Sec. 402A, and for the safety of the citizens of Utah as well as
the proper apportionment of costs from injury, it must be rejected.
Subquestion A. The Majority Of Jurisdictions, Following
Better Reasoned Analysis And Upon Policy
Considerations In Accordance With Those of
Utah, Hold That Comment k To The
Restatement Second of Torts, Sec. 402A Is
A Limited Exception To Strict Liability To
Be Proven By A Defendant As An Affirmative
Defense Rather Than A Blanket Immunity
J
Granted To One Class Of Manufacturers.
The
previously

available
briefed

relevant
and

case

addressed

law
in

and

authorities

Plaintiffs'
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Response

were
in

Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
(Rec. pp

96-117)

Therefore, the argument herein will endeavor to

briefly apprise this Court of the continued uniform rejection
throughout the United States of Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d
470

(Calif.1988), respond to contentions and argument made by

Upjohn in its reply brief to the District Court (Rec. p.174) and
apprise the Court of other relevant Utah decisions impacting upon
this issue.
Preliminarily,

it is crucial to recognize what Upjohn is

endeavoring to have this Court do, should it decide that Comment k
will be adopted in Utah, and how such position is not only directly
contrary to the public policies of the state but also seeks to
twist the Restatement and its Comments beyond recognition.

The

text of Sec. 402A provides the black letter statement of the law
found by the Restatement and adopted by this court in Hahn, and the
text constitutes the teeth of its mandate.

Upjohn urges this Court

to transform a narrow, limited, specific and qualified defense
contained in a Comment, upon which Upjohn bears the burden of
proof, into a blanket exemption for one class of manufacturers, to
wit, prescription drug manufacturers.

Upjohn then further attempts

to have this Court issue a ruling which strikes forever more any
count predicated upon strict liability for each and every citizen
of

the

state

of

Utah

thereby

depriving

such

citizen

of

an

opportunity to establish that it is a defective and unreasonably
dangerous prescription drug which caused his or her injury.

Even

Upjohn recognizes, however, pursuant to the anomalous California
case which it urges upon this Court, that prescription drugs can be
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held to be defective as well as unreasonably dangerous in design if
they are neither properly marketed nor accompanied by adequate
warnings.

Upjohn's Reply, Rec. p.176.

The continued vitality and availability of strict liability as
a

cause of action against prescription drug manufacturers was

recognized in Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 751, P.2d
470, 245 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1988), and continues to be recognized as a
viable cause of action against prescription drug manufacturers by
California citizens.
F.Supp.546

In Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm. Co. , 711

(S.D.Calif.1989),

the

district

court

addressed

and

discussed the Brown decision and denied summary judgment on the
strict liability claims sought by defendant therein in that factual
questions

existed

with

regard

to

the

adequacy

of

warnings.

Therefore, Upjohn's reliance upon Brown is misplaced to the extent
that the defendant seeks, contrary to the law of California, that
this Court not only adopt Brown but also extend Brown so that the
limited

affirmative

defense

of

Comment

k

would

somehow

be

transformed into an absolute barrier to any strict liability action
against
position

a prescription
despite

recognizes

that

the
a

drug manufacturer.
fact that

even

pharmaceutical

Upjohn

urges this

California, under Brown,
manufacturer's

potential

responsibility under the doctrine of strict liability is a question
of fact for the jury upon a showing of disputed evidence.
Since the submission of the initial briefs to the District
Court on this issue, numerous other State Supreme and Appellate
courts, as well as federal district courts applying state law, have
considered the issue and unanimously and uniformly have reached the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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conclusion that the Comment k "unavoidably unsafe" affirmative
defense should be made on a case by case basis with regard to
prescription drugs.

These decisions include: Savina v. Sterling

Drug, Inc., 247 Kan. 105, 795 P.2d 915 (1990);
793 S.W.2d 394 (Mo.App.1990)

Pollard v. Ashbv,

(en banc) motion for rehearing or

transfer to Supreme Court of Missouri denied
application

to

transfer

denied

(September

9,

(July 2, 1990)
1990);

Senn v.

Merrell-Dow, 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215, Ans. conformed to, 850 F.2d
611 (9th Cir.1988);

Rogers v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 802 P.2d

1346, 1991 WL 1246 (Wash.1991); Miles Laboratories, Inc. Cutter
Laboratories Div. v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107 (Md.1990)4.

The Court of

Appeals of Florida is also apparently about to come into accord
with the majority of jurisdictions.5

Several other courts, in

addition to those enumerated above and identified in Judge Greene's
Certification Order at p.7, have determined that the case by case
approach for application of Comment k should be followed.
include:

These

Rohrbough by Rohrbough v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 719

F.Supp. 470 (N.D.W.Va.1989) (applying West Virginia law); Singer
v.Sterling Drug Co., 461 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.), cert denied 409 U.S.
878 (1972) (applying Indiana law); Hawkinson v. A. H. Robins Co.,
595 F.Supp. 1290 (D.Colo.1984) (applying Colorado law).
4 The court in Miles Laboratory addressed a prescription product
available only through a physician.
The court did not
automatically apply Comment k but rather engaged in a product
specific detailed analysis for five and one half pages. The court
cited to Fellows v. U.S.V. Pharmaceutical Corp., 502 F.Supp. 297
(D.Md.1980), wherein the District Court wrongly predicted that
Maryland would apply Comment k to all prescription drug products,
and concluded that the prescription product at issue was subject to
Comment k only after the case specific analysis, employed by the
vast majority of other jurisdictions.
5 Adams v. G.D.Searle & Co., Inc., 1991 WL 3575 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.
Jan 18, 1991) (not yet been released for publication.)
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In reality, by asking this Court to prohibit the pursuit of
any

strict

liability

count

in any

pharmaceutical

action

ever

brought in Utah, Upjohn is asking this Court to hold that strict
liability has been preempted as a viable cause of action in Utah.
Upjohn's

argument

is

predicated

essentially

on

two

trembling

pillars, to wit, comprehensive federal regulation by the FDA and
availability of insurance.6

Both of these arguments have been

properly rejected by this Court.

In Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons,

Inc. , 682 P.2d 832, 836 (Utah 1984), this Court specifically held,
in accordance with the vast majority of jurisdictions, that FDA
regulations
standards"

regarding
and

prescription

a manufacturer's

drugs

compliance

"are

merely

therewith

minimum
will not

relieve it of potential liability under state law.
The

holdings

of

the

court

in

MacGillierav

v.

Lederle

Laboratories, 667 F.Supp 743 (D.Md.1987), are instructive and in
clear accordance with the law of Utah, as recognized in Barson,
regarding the effect of Federal Regulations.

In MacGillieray the

court specifically held that comprehensive federal regulations in
the area of marketing and design did not preempt strict products
liability tort law on defective design even though the product at
issue was a vaccine.

The court also found support in a decision of

the United States Supreme Court and quoted the following:
We are even more reluctant to infer pre-emption
from the comprehensiveness of regulations than
from the comprehensiveness of statutes. As a
result of their specialized functions agencies
6 As noted previously, Upjohn especially has no basis upon which
to argue this fictitious insurance crisis rationale since it has
sworn to interrogatory answers that it is self-insured in this
action. (Rec. p 117).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

normally deal with problems in far more detail
than does Congress.
To infer pre-emption
whenever
an agency deals with a problem
comprehensively
is virtually tantamount to
saying that whenever a federal agency decides
to step into a field, its regulations will be
exclusive.

Id. at 745, citing Hillsborough County Florida v. Automated Medical
Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 715, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2377, 85 L.Ed.2d 714
(1985) (emphasis added).
The court

in MacGillierav

continued

and recognized

that "a

tort judgment against a drug manufacturer may in fact accelerate
development

of

better,

safer products" and

that

"public

policy

militates against finding as a matter of law that FDA approval of a
particular

drug

relieves

a

pharmaceutical

company

of

further

responsibility to continue research and testing to develop safer
products."

MacGillieray, 667 F.Supp. at 745.

Significantly, the

court also observed the choice which this Court must make on behalf
of the state of Utah.
by

the

FDA's

manufacturer

"A state may decide that while it must abide

determination

must

nonetheless

that

a

bear

the

drug

is

expense

marketable,
of

the

the

risk of

injuries, particularly where there is evidence that suggests that
the

product

may

be

subject

to

improvement."

Id.

at

745-746.

"Federal legislation has traditionally occupied a limited role as
the floor of safe conduct; before transforming

such

legislation

into a ceiling on the ability of states to protect their citizens,
and thereby radically adjusting the historic federal-state balance,
courts should wait for a clear statement of congressional intent to
work such an alteration."

Id. at 746, citing Ferebee v. Chevron
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Chemical Co,. 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C.Cir.), cert denied 469 U.S.
1062, 105 S.Ct. 545, 83 L.Ed.2d 432 (1984).
By its very title, Comment k to Sec. 402A only applies to
"unavoidably unsafe" products, and as found by the vast majority of
decisions previously cited, such comment necessitates an evaluation
of whether the product at issue can be made safer and whether such
danger which exists is in fact "unavoidable".
two

components

of

an

unavoidably

The latter of these

unsafe

product

clearly

contemplates an examination of whether suitable safer alternatives
are

available.

decision.

The

FDA

does

not

make

any

such

analysis

or

The fact that there may be a more effective drug or a

superior alternative available to the drug sought to be licensed
for marketing is irrelevant to the FDA as clearly evidenced by its
approval of Halcion despite its findings that Halcion was neither
unique

nor

essential

and

available alternatives.

that

it

presented

no

advance

over

(Rec. P.94 and Exhibit "B" to Plaintiffs'

Response and Memorandum in Opposition).
The

availability

of

a doctrine

of

liability

without

fault

reflecting decades of American jurisprudence and development of the
law, has been found by this Court to be a valid public policy
serving the interests of the citizens of this state by spurring
safety

research

Hahn, supra.

that

may

reveal

hidden

or

unrevealed

dangers.

What Upjohn in fact asks this Court to adopt is a

rule which directly inures to benefit producers who are unaware of
risks

and

thus

tends

to

perpetuate

and

encourage

ignorance.

Further, such a rule affirmatively encourages the most rapid race
to market to allow the "first" manufacturer to reap the enormous
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profits available from the introduction of a new prescription drug
at the expense of sufficient and scientifically honest testing.
The absolute prohibition of the remedy of strict liability which
Upjohn seeks to have this Court announce is, in fact, contrary to
the holding of its alleged "lead" authority in California and is in
truth nothing more than a back-handed attempt at preemption7 and
contrary to all decisions considering the issue.
Tetracycline

Cases.

747

F.Supp

543,

See e.g., In Re

547-548

(W.D.Mo.

1989)

(collecting almost twenty decisions rejecting preemption), as well
as Masur v. Merck & Co. Inc., 742 F.Supp 239, 247 (E.D.Pa. 1990)
(rejecting

preemption

and

further

finding

that

the

federal

regulations of prescription drugs serve a different purpose than
state tort law as the former merely limits the manufacture of such
product to those few applicants who meet stringent and specific
criteria

while

the

latter

serves

the

different

compensating victims injured by those very products).

purpose

of

Recourse to

state tort law was found necessary to encourage safer products.
The court in Masur also observed that even pursuant to Pennsylvania
law, it is the manufacturer which must show compliance with the
applicable standards of care in order to avoid strict liability.
Id at 252.
In affirmatively rejecting the Brown decision and determining
that Comment k applicability, in accordance with the vast majority
of jurisdictions, is an affirmative defense to be proven by the
manufacturer,

the

court

in

Pollard

v.

Ashbv,

supra,

first

7 Upjohn has repeatedly asserted and represented that it is not
seeking preemption. Yet in truth, such is the rule it seeks this
Court to impose.
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recognized that the American Law Institute itself defeated a motion
to exempt all prescription drugs from strict liability based upon
the alleged public policy concerns of encouraging research testing
and development.

Pollard, 793 S.W.2d at 400, citing 38 ALI Proc.

19, 90-98 (1961). 8

The court then held:

Where the case involves a design defect in
a prescription drug, the burden shifts to the
manufacturer to show that the drug falls within
the realm of comment k protection.
Thus
several states have held that the defendant
must raise comment k as an affirmative defense.
Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064,
1068
(8thCir.
1989);
Toner
v.
Lederle
Laboratories. 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297, 307
(1987). These courts have held that there are
two requirements to establish the comment k
defense.
First,
the
manufacturer
must
demonstrate
that
the
drug's
risk
is
"unavoidable." This is shown by demonstrating
that, given the current state of knowledge, no
feasible alternative design exists that would
accomplish the same purpose with a lesser risk.
Id. at 306.
Next, the manufacturer must
demonstrate that the overall benefit of the
drug outweighs the risk created by it.
This
weighing must be done as of the time the
product is distributed to the plaintiff.
Id.
at 305-306.
This balancing test is important
in that "it does not serve society that an
unavoidably
unsafe
product,
which
has
occasional or fractious benefit should enjoy
insulation from strict liability in tort when
the
product's
predominant
effects
are
detrimental to individual and public safety."
Willig, the Comment k Character: A Conceptual
Barrier to Strict Liability, 29 Mercer L.Rev.
545, 545 (1978). This court holds that comment
k
is
an
affirmative
defense
and
its
applicability must be determined by the trial
8
Judge Greene has also noted that even in Brown the court
acknowledged and recognized that members of the ALI who drafted
Sec. 402A and its comments considered and rejected an explicit
exemption of all prescription drugs from strict liability.
Memorandum decision and Order attached as Exhibit A to the District
Courts Certification Order at p.8-9, citing Brown, 751 P.2d at
475, 38 ALI Proc. 19,90-98 (1961), and Hill v. Searle Laboratories,
884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989).
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courts on a case-by-case basis• Hill v. Searle
Laboratories,
884
F.2d
1064,
1069
(8th
Cir.1989); Toner v. Lederle Laboratories. 732
P.2d at 303-09.
Pollard, 793 S.W.2d at 400 (footnotes omitted).
In Patten v. Lederle Laboratories,

676 F.Supp.

233

(D.Utah

1987), Judge Greene properly predicted the appropriate law of Utah,
should Comment k be adopted at all, based on the very terms of
Comment k itself, public policy considerations and the recognition
that

even

establishing

the

applicability

of

Comment

k

for

a

particular drug fails to remove the issue of strict liability from
the case, as limitations on the scope of Comment k immunity are
"universally recognized."

Id. at 236. [citations omitted].

Case

by case analysis with the burden on the party seeking to insulate
itself

from

its recognized
was,

liability under
and

remains,

law based upon this

affirmative

defense

the

only

appropriate

resolution.

Even proof of Comment k applicability by a defendant,

however, does not and cannot remove, as a matter of law, potential
strict liability.
As held by the court in Hill v. Searle. supra, a product may
be found to be defective and the manufacturer of a prescription
drug still subject to strict liability "when it is properly made
according to an unreasonably dangerous design, or when it is not
accompanied by adequate instructions and warnings of the dangers
attending its use."

Hill. 884 F.2d at 1067, quoting from Prosser,

Law of Torts, 659 (4th Ed. 1971) .

Upjohn itself also admits that

Comment k is inapplicable if the product was not properly marketed
or accompanied by inadequate warnings.

(Rec. p.176)
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The complaint

in this action in fact alleges that Halcion was not properly
marketed

as

Upjohn

concealed

and

misrepresented

data

and

information to the FDA as part of the approval process. (Rec. pp. 910).

Yet Upjohn apparently adheres to its contradictory contention

that strict liability should be stricken from every pharmaceutical
drug products liability case heretofore brought by any citizen of
Utah, no matter how dangerous or defective that drug

is and

regardless of whether the drug was properly brought to market at
all.

Clearly, the position espoused by Upjohn is not now, nor

should it be adopted as, the law of the state of Utah.
The second of the two purported public policy arguments Upjohn
asserts as allegedly supporting its contention that the citizens of
Utah should never again be able to pursue a claim against any
pharmaceutical manufacturer under the strict liability doctrine
which is available to Utah citizens in actions against all other
manufacturers

is

the

unavailability

of

insurance.

Upjohn

extensively (and irrelevantly) argued before the District Court in
favor of absolute immunity from strict liability for itself and
other

pharmaceutical

unavailability
Court

based

of products liability

however,

contention.

manufacturers

has

flatly

and

upon

the

alleged

insurance coverage.

definitively

rejected

This
this

Berry by and through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d

670 (Utah 1985), not only recognized the public policy interest in
favor of the consumer, especially with regard to prescription
drugs, but further held:
The Utah statute of repose is incapable of
achieving the avowed purpose of reducing the
insurance premiums that manufacturers must pay.
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Product liability insurance premiums for Utah
manufacturing companies are established on the
basis
of
nationwide
data,
not
on
a
manufacturer's experience in Utah.
[cite
omitted]
"Although assuring the availability
of
reasonably
priced
products
liability
insurance is an admirable goal, it will not be
accomplished or even furthered by limiting
access to courts in this state where such
access is seldom sought."
Id. at 681-2, citing Note, The Utah Product Liability Limitation of
Action:

An

Unfair

Utah.L.Rev. 149 at 151.
safety

concerns

Resolution

of

Competing

Concerns,

1979

This Court also recognized serious public

implicated

by

granting

manufacturers

immunity

through a statute of repose and thereby providing less incentive
for those very manufacturers who take adequate safety precautions
and resulting in an increase in "the already substantial number of
persons who have been injured by shoddy design or workmanship."
Berry, 717 P.2d at 683.
at

Utah

Code

Ann.

The entire Product Liability Act, codified
§§78-15-3

unconstitutional and invalid.

through

6,

was

declared

Id. at 686.9

9
Upjohn did not advise the District Court that the entire
products liability act, including the specific provision asserted
in its reply memorandum, Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6, was declared
unconstitutional.
Subsequent to this Court's decision in Berry,
the Utah legislature again considered the unconstitutional products
liability act, repealed specific provisions, including its findings
regarding insurance coverage availability, amended other sections,
readopted section 1, but did not reenact Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6.
Since the Utah legislature deemed it necessary to repeal and reenact even portions of the chapter which were not amended, e.g.
Sec. 1 of 78-15-6, it has apparently determined that Utah Code
Ann.Sec.78-15-6 should not be the law of Utah.
While research
disclosed no Utah cases on point as to the effect of cited
amendments
to
statutes
subsequently
refining
or
curing
unconstitutionality, there is a conflict as to whether such
amendments are effective at all. See, e.g. , In The Interest of
RAS, 249 Ga. 236, 290 S.E.2d 34, (1982) (holding that such
amendments are improper); Valente v. Miles, 93 Idaho 212, 458 P.2d
84 (Idaho 1969) (contra), and cases collected in 82 C.J.S. statutes
Sec. 247(b) as well as 16 Am. Jur. Con. Law §258;.
As the Utah
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UpJohn's invocation of Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6(3) not only is
unavailing but also is directly contrary to the rule that Upjohn
seeks to have this Court impose.

That subsection provides:

(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a
product is free from any defect or defective
condition where the alleged defect in the plans
or designs for the product or the methods and
techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and
testing the product were in conformity with
government
standards
established
for
that
industry which were in existence at the time
the plans or designs for the product or the
methods
and
techniques
of
manufacturing,
inspecting
and
testing
the
product
were
adopted.
Just

as

Upjohn

implores

this

Court

to

ignore

the

clear

language of Comment k, Upjohn has ignored the clear and definitive
terms

of

this

declaration

very

statute.

as unconstitutional,

Without

dispute,

the Utah

prior

legislature

to

its

determined

that there was only a rebuttable presumption that a product was not
defective if it in fact fully complied with government standards.
What Upjohn seeks, however, is the imposition of an irrebuttable
presumption that upon alleged compliance with FDA regulations, no
plaintiff may proceed under the doctrine of strict liability and
prove the defective and unreasonably
product.
statement

dangerous character

of the

That is directly contrary to the legislature's express
in

the

statute.

Upjohn

improperly

asserts

that

compliance with FDA regulations relieves it from strict liability
as a matter of law and that plaintiffs should not be entitled to
present any evidence whatsoever to the court or to the jury on that
legislature apparently deemed it necessary to repeal and re-enact
even those portions which contain no amendment, it seems likely
that the legislature did not intend to re-enact Section 78-15-6.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

issue.

Upjohn attempts to deprive an injured individual of any

opportunity to rebut the presumption at all.

Clearly, the statute

evidences the legislature's intent that strict liability remain a
viable and proper cause of action for the citizens of Utah.
Utah

legislature

indicated

anything

in

enacting

the

If the

rebuttable

presumption statute, it in fact mandated a case by case analysis of
Comment k, for in rebutting the statutory presumption, plaintiffs
would have to submit the very evidence going to defect and strict
liability which Upjohn seeks to exclude.
A similar

attempt

absolute prohibition
against

to assert

a statutory presumption

against pursuing

a drug manufacturer

numerous

was directly

Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 913-932
the Kansas
3304(a),

statute at

did

not

rejected

contain

the

of

action

in Savina v.

(Kan.1990).

issue therein, Kansas

even

causes

as an

Although

Statutes Ann. §60-

"rebuttable

presumption"

provisions of the Utah Code, the Supreme Court of Kansas stated
that

at

best

regulations

a

under

manufacturer's
the

code

compliance

section

with

created

presumption of the adequacy of any warnings.

only

FDA
a

rules

and

rebuttable

Thus, the Supreme

Court of Kansas did not even need to reach the strict liability
issue of whether the product was defective, as the statute directly
refuted the manufacturer's claim therein that the statute created
an irrebutable presumption.

The position rejected by Kansas is

exactly the position Upjohn presses upon this Court in the present
case.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-97-

Upjohn

has

also

asserted

that

the

Utah

legislature

expressed a public policy in favor of pharmaceutical

has

manufacturers

with the enactment of Utah Code Ann. §78-18-2 which provides:
(1)
Punitive damages may not be awarded if a
drug causing the claimant's harm:
(a)
received
premarket
approval
or
licensure
by
the
Federal
Food
and
Drug
Administration under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 301 et sea,
or the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.
Section 201 et seq.;
(b) is generally recognized as safe and
effective under conditions established by the
Federal
Food
and
Drug
Administration
and
applicable regulations, including packaging and
labeling regulations.
(2)
This limitation on liability for punitive
damages does not apply if it is shown by clear
and
convincing
evidence
that
the
drug
manufacturer
knowingly
withheld
or
misrepresented
information
required
to
be
submitted
to
the
Federal
Food
and
Drug
Administration
under
its regulations,
which
information was material and relevant to the
claimant's harm.
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-2 1 0
First,

by

its

punitive damages.
actions

for

(emphasis added)

express

section,

compensatory

a

this

statute

is

limited

to

It establishes that the legislature did not deem

manufacturers to be affected
code

terms

legislative

damages

against

pharmaceutical

in anyway by FDA approval under this
statement

directly

contrary

to

the

fundamental predicate of Upjohn's entire argument, to wit, that a
cause

of

citizens

action
of

for strict

the

state

of

liability,
Utah,

should

otherwise
not

be

available
permitted

to

all

against

10
As the Grundberg cause of action arose on June 19, 1988, and
since §78-18-2 is not applicable to cases arising before May 1,
1989, it actually has no bearing on the present action.
Upjohn's
counsel has so represented to the District Court in previous oral
argument.
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Upjohn or any other manufacturer of prescription drugs despite the
fact that the action is seeking compensatory damages.

Further, a

thoughtful analysis of §78-18-2(2) establishes that the legislature
supports

a

case

by

case

consideration

of

potential

Comment

k

applicability where there are allegations that a drug has not been
properly

marketed

due

to

a

manufacturer's

withholding

or

misrepresentation of information required to be submitted to the
FDA.

In such a situation, the legislature has conferred upon the

citizens of the state of Utah an absolute right to pursue punitive
damages in order to punish such defendants and to deter further
misconduct.

In fact, it has been noted that if a manufacturer

falsifies its application to the FDA for drug approval, it cannot
avoid strict liability.
Liability;

Not

All

Note, A Prescription For Applying Strict

Drugs

Deserve

Comment

k

Immunization.

21

Ariz.St.L.J. 809, 817 n.69 (1989).
All of the law of Utah, the public policies supporting strict
liability

and

decades

of

precedent

dating

back

even

to

ultra-

hazardous activities, as recognized by this Court in Hahn, support
the

continued

availability

of

strict

liability

mechanism for the citizens of this state.
this

Court,

manufacturers

now

and

from

that

forever
doctrine

more,
of

a

viable

Upjohn seeks to have

immunize
strict

as

one

liability

class

of

otherwise

available to the citizens of this state as a means of redressing
injuries caused by and attributable to all other manufacturers.

As

Judge Greene has found, in accordance with the vast majority of the
authorities considering Comment k, the "unavoidably unsafe" element
necessitates

consideration

of whether

a product
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is made

in the

safest

possible

manner

inherent risks,

and

whether

its

benefits

outweigh

(Order of Certification at p.5)

its

So long as a

product can be made safer it is not, by definition, "unavoidably"
unsafe.

Therefore, when a manufacturer fails to show that no safer

alternatives exist, the majority of courts have refused to apply
Comment

k

in

unavoidable.

obvious

recognition

that

the

danger

is

not

See, .e.g. , Patten, 676 F.Supp. at 236, as well as

Toner, supra, Feldman, supra, and the wealth of other authorities
previously noted discussing the inapplicability of Comment k where
more

suitable

available.
Comment

alternatives

Similarly,

if

to
a

prescription

product's

k will not be applied.

drugs

danger

is

could

be

unnecessary,

See, Note, A Prescription

For

Applying Strict Liability, supra at 815, citing Brochu v. OrthoPharmaceutical , 642 F.2d 652

(1st Cir.1981)

(holding that if the

danger is unnecessary the product is defective regardless of its
utility) .

As Comment k explains, it is only when the danger is

unavoidable and the utility is great that strict liability may be
avoided by proper warnings.

Avoidably unsafe products deserve no

protection; yet, clearly, adopting Comment k as a blanket immunity
for all prescription drugs would do just that.

Neither society nor

this Court should encourage the production of harmful substances
that

can

be

made

safer.

See,

Note,

supra,

at

pp.

824-825.

Adoption of the proposed blanket immunity espoused by Upjohn is not
only contrary to the interests of society in redressing injury but
further

will

ineffective
Comment

k

encourage

drugs

with

the

manufacturing

marginal

itself mandates

utility

an examination

and

despite
of

marketing
the

fact

of
that

its usefulness and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

efficacy.

Since the benefits of any particular drug, provide the

fundamental justification for its availability to the market, this
Court can enhance the safety of such drugs and the accountability
of

drug

efficacy

manufacturers
and

by

beneficial

requiring
aspects

proof

of

of

the

prescription

usefulness,
drugs

as

a

precursor to invoking the terms and protection of Comment k.
The California Supreme Court in Brown failed to explain, ever,
how the dangers of any new drug can in truth be unavoidable if in
fact

safer

alternatives

existed,

despite having

safer alternatives can and do exist.
purposes,

policies

and

rationales

recognized

that

Note, supra at 826.

The

behind

FDA

consideration

of

approval of a drug based upon self testing by a manufacturer and
those policies underlying tort law of the various states which is
designed

to

protect

and

insure

not

only

safety

but

also

compensation and right of redress for citizens properly co-exist.
The former cannot be held to override the latter.

Upjohn7s attempt

to convince this Court otherwise is patently wrong.
blanket

immunity

for

prescription

drug

In rejecting

manufacturers,

Justice

Huntley, recognizing what pharmaceutical manufacturers sought, was
compelled to note, in his special concurrence that:
I fear the day when the State Supreme Court can
be convinced that an agency, such as the FDA,
no matter how well intentioned can supplant the
American Judicial system.
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories. 732 P.2d 297, 313 (Idaho 1987).
As the majority recognized

in Toner, the California court's

adoption in Brown of blanket immunity from strict liability for all
prescription drugs "runs counter both to the express language of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Comment k and to common sense.
such immunity to all drugs."
has not

been

adopted

Brown provides no explanation for

Toner, 732 P.2d at 309, 310.

outside the

borders

of

California

Brown
and

is

uniformly and consistently rejected by the courts considering it.
It is clear that this Court, on behalf of the citizens of the state
of Utah, should do likewise.
Upjohn has repeatedly contended that the "warnings" element of
strict

liability

is

nothing

more

than

a

negligence

standard.

Plaintiffs previous Response Memorandum in Opposition to Upjohn's
Motion

addresses

this

contention and the arguments therein will not be repeated.

The

clear

for

Partial

distinctions

claims

based

negligence

was

upon

Summary

between
strict

clearly

and

Judgment

a

proper

liability
eloquently

extensively

consideration
versus

of

those

addressed

by

warnings

based
the

upon

Supreme

Court of New Jersey in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J.
429, 479 A. 2d 374

(1984).

Therein, the court clearly recognized

the

between

the

distinctions

appropriate

placements

distinctions.

of

burden

liability
of

proof

doctrines
arising

and
from

The court held:

In strict liability warning cases, unlike
negligence cases, however, the defendant should
properly bear the burden of proving that the
information was not reasonably available or
obtainable and that it therefore lacked actual
or constructive knowledge of the defect. Wade
(1983)
supra,
at
760-61;
see
Pollock,
"Liability of a Blood Bank or Hospital for a
Hepatitis Associated Blood Transfusion in New
Jersey"
2 Seton Hall L.Rev. 47, 60 (1970)
("burden of proof that hepatitis
is not
detectable and unremovable should rest on the
defendant
blood
bank or hospital).
The
defendant is in a superior position to know the
technological
material
or
data
in
the
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the
those

particular field or specialty.
The defendant
is the expert, often performing self-testing.
It is the defendant that injected the product
in the stream of commerce of its economic gain.
As a matter of policy the burden of proving the
status of knowledge in the field at the time of
distribution
is
properly
placed
on
the
defendant. [citations omitted]
, 97 N.J. at

, 479 A.2d at 388.

This is clearly the appropriate

ruling for this Court.
Subquestion B. Whether a Prescription Drug is Unavoidably
Unsafe is a Mixed Question of Law and Fact
Which Must be Submitted To and Resolved by
a Jury Unless Reasonable Minds Could Not
Differ
Assuming
unsafe

that

exception

this

to

Honorable

strict

Court

products

adopts

liability

Comment k to Sec. 402A of the Restatement
further

assuming

that

this

Court

adopts

the
as

unavoidably

set

forth

in

(Second) of Torts and
that

exception

as

an

affirmative defense to be pleaded and proved by the manufacturer on
a case by case basis, plaintiffs submit that the application of
that

exception

to

a

particular

drug

appropriately resolved by a jury.
holding

would

be

most

is

a

question

of

fact

Plaintiffs submit that such a

consistent

with

the

state

of

Utah's

constitutional and statutory law guaranteeing the right of a jury
trial in civil cases and that it would be in accord with the better
reasoned decisions on that issue reported in other jurisdictions.
Utah law guarantees litigants the right of a jury trial in
civil cases.
11

Utah Const.art.I, §10.

1

See International Harvestor

Article I, §10 provides that:
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate.
In courts of general jurisdiction,
except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight
jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement,
(Utah 1981) .

Inc., 626 P.2d 418

"All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury,

other than those mentioned in the next section [§78-21-3] 12 , are to
be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon is to be addressed
to them, except when otherwise provided."
[brackets

and

footnote

Procedure 38 and 39.
"unavoidably
exceptions

unsafe"
identified

added].

See

Utah Code Ann. §78-21-2.

also

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Whether a particular prescription drug is
is a factual question
in

§78-21-3.

Thus,

not

included

that

issue

in the
is

one

appropriately submitted to a jury.
Some courts have concluded that the trial court should hear
the evidence on the unavoidably unsafe product issue outside the
presence of the jury and make a determination on that issue based
thereon.
P.2d

See Johnson v. American Cynamid, 239 Kan. 279,

1318, 1323

(1986);

, 718

Pollard v. Ashbv. 793 S.W.2d 394, 400

(Mo.Ct.App. 1990) (en banc).

Neither of these courts engaged in a

significant analysis in concluding that the court rather than the
jury render a decision on the unavoidably unsafe issue.

The court

in Johnson merely stated that "[p]ublic policy requires that the
consist of four jurors.
In criminal cases the verdict
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the
jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall
be waived unless demanded.
12 The only exceptions to the requirement in §78-21-2 that a jury
resolve all factual disputes are identified in §78-21-2, which
provides that:
All questions of law, including the admissibility of
evidence, the facts preliminary to such admission, the
construction of statutes and other writings, and the
application of the rules of evidence are to be decided by
the court and all discussions of law addressed to it.
Whenever the knowledge of the court is by law made
evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such
knowledge to the jury, who are bound to accept it.
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mere manufacture

of the

[Sabin-type

live polio vaccine] not be

actionable on the ground of design defect."
m

, 718 P.2d at 1323.

Johnson, 239 Kan. at

The Missouri Court of Appeals stated that

"comment k is an affirmative defense and its applicability must be
determined by the trial courts on a case by case basis."
793 S.W.2d at 400.
Kan. 105,

See also Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc. , 247

, 795 P.2d 915, 926

proposition

that

the

Pollard,

trial

judge

(1990)
should

(citing Johnson for the
hear

evidence

on

the

unavoidably unsafe product issue outside the presence of the jury
and make a determination on that issue before submitting the case
to the jury).

The court in Savina likewise failed to analyze the

"judge" or "jury" issue.

However, the court did provide guidance

as to the factors relevant to determining the unavoidably unsafe
issue:
"In our view, the decision as to whether a
drug, vaccine, or any other product triggers
unavoidably dangerous product exemption from
strict liability design defect analysis poses a
mixed question of law and fact and can be made
only after evidence is first taken, out of the
jury's presence, on the relevant factors to be
considered.
[Citations omitted.]
A trial
court should take evidence as to: (1) whether,
when distributed, the product was intended to
confer an exceptionally important benefit that
made its availability highly desirable; (2)
whether the then-existing risk posed by the
product
was
both
* substantial7
and
*unavoidable'; and (3) whether the interest in
availability (again measured as of the time of
distribution)
outweighs
the
interest
in
promoting
enhanced
accountability
through
strict liability design defect review.
In
determining the first aspect of the second
factor
(i.e., whether the risk posed was
^substantial'),
a
court
should
consider
whether, at the time of distribution, the risk
posed permanent or long-term disability (e.g.,
loss of body function, organs or death) as
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opposed to mere temporary or insignificant
inconvenience (e.g., skin rash, minor allergic
reaction, etc.).
In determining the second
aspect of the second factor (i.e., whether the
risk posed was xunavoidable'), a court should
consider (i) whether the product was designated
to
minimize-to
the
extent
scientifically
knowable at the time it was distributed-the
risk inherent in the product, and (ii) the
availability-again,
at
the
time
of
distribution-of any alternative product that
would have as effectively accomplished the full
intended purpose of the subject product."
172
Cal.App.3d at 829-30, 218 Cal.Rptr. 453.

Savina, 247 Kan. at 105, 795 P.2d at 925, quoting Kearl v. Lederle
Laboratories, 172 Cal.App.3d 812, 829-830, 218 Cal.Rptr. 453,
(1985), overruled in Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 245
Cal.Rptr.412, 751 P.2d 470 (1988) (emphasis in original) 13
Despite the opinions discussed above, plaintiffs submit that
the

better

reasoned

decisions

on

this

issue

delegate

the

"unavoidably unsafe" issue to a jury unless reasonable minds could
not differ.

4

"Comment k's applicability is a mixed question of

13
The Supreme Court of Kansas expressly rejected Brown and
concluded that Kearl provided a sound framework for determining a
whether particular drug was unavoidably unsafe.
Savina, 247 Kan.
at
, 795 P. 2d at 926.
The court also concluded that the
appropriate time upon which the analysis should focus is the time
that the product was distributed and used by the injured
individual, even though the information had changed since the drug
was originally introduced into the market. Id. at
, 795 P.2d at
926.
14
"When reasonable minds could not differ" is akin to stating
"there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact."
See Utah
Rule of Civ.P. 56(c).
Seen in that perspective, the issue of
whether a drug is unavoidably unsafe is a question for the court
only where there is no genuine issue of any material fact for a
jury to resolve.
In such a situation, the trial court might
properly consider a motion for summary judgment.
See Ulibarri v.
Christehson, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170 (1954) (summary judgment
may be based on an affirmative defense) .
But see Rohrbouah by
Rohrbouah v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 719 F.Supp. 470, 477
(N.D.W.Va.1989) (whether Comment k applies cannot be a basis for
summary judgment because its applicability rests on the factual
issue of whether a safe, equally effective vaccine exists that
Wyeth could have marketed).
The trial court also might strike a
Comment k affirmative defense upon development of the evidence
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law and fact."

Castrianano v. E.R.Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d

775, 781 (R.I. 1988), citing Toner. 112 Idaho at 333 n.4, 732 P.2d
at

302

n.4

(1987).

M

[W]hether

question of fact and law.

Comment

k

applies

is

a mixed

If reasonable minds could reach only one

conclusion, then the trial judge may rule; but if reasonable minds
might

differ,

then the matter must

be submitted

to the

jury."

Adams v. G. D. Searle & Co., Inc., 1991 WL 3575 (Fla.App.
2 Dist. Jan.18, 1991)-, citing Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 782.
also,

Davila

v. Bodelson,

103 N.M.

243, 704 P.2d

(Ct.App.1985) , cert, denied, 103 N.M. 177, 704 P.2d 431

See
1119

(1985) .

Whether Comment k applies to a particular prescription drug is a
question for the jury based upon the following factors:
(i)

whether
the product
could
have
been
designed in a safer manner;
(ii) whether a safer alternative product could
have been made available at the time of
manufacture and sale to accomplish the
same intended purpose in questions (sic);
and
(iii)whether
the benefits
of the product
outweigh
the
interest
in
promoting
enhanced accountability on the part of the
manufacturer.
Kociemba v. G.D.Searle & Co., 695 F.Supp. 432, 433 (D.Minn.1988) ;,
citing the district court's earlier opinion at 680 F.Supp. 1293,
where it becomes clear that such a defense is not available in
light of the proofs developed at trial.
See Graham v. Wveth
Laboratories, 906 F.2d 1399, 1406 (10th Cir.1990). In Graham, the
district court struck Wveth's §402A Comment k defense and denied
its motion for summary judgment based thereon at a hearing during
trial.
The district court found that a material dispute of fact
precluded a determination on the unavoidably unsafe issue at the
summary judgment stage. The court submitted the issue of "design
defect" to the jury.
The "jury's affirmative answer to
interrogatory 4 ("design defect") must be read as a jury finding
that Wyeth's vaccine was "avoidably," and not "unavoidably," unsafe
" Id. at 1406-07.
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1301 (D.Minn. 1988), and

Patten v. Lederle Laboratories,

676 F.Supp. 233 (D.Utah 1987) .
Though declining to decide the issue in the case before it,
the Supreme Court of Idaho summarized the conflicting positions on
the

issue

of

whether

a

judge

or

the

jury

should

decide

the

unavoidably unsafe product issue:
The instant case does not present this
issue of whether the judge or the jury ought to
determine the application of comment k to a
particular
product.
Some
courts
and
commentators,
emphasizing
the
factual
determinations necessary, leave it to the jury.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 772 P.2d
410, 416 (Colo.1986); Willig, supra, 29 Mercer
L.Rev. at 579; W. Prosser, The Law of Torts
(4th ed.1971)
("When any evidence can be
produced that
[the risk] might have been
avoided, [strict liability] becomes a question
for the jury, and may lead to liability."
(footnote omitted.))
Others, concerned with
the policy implications of the decision, would
have the court decide comment k's application
as a matter of law.
Johnson v. American
Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan.279, 718 P.2d 1318, 132324 (1986); Schwartz, supra, 42 Wash. & Lee
L.Rev. at 1147-48; Wade, supra, 44 Miss.L.J. at
838,844.
Either
way
the
decision
of
the
applicability of comment k pertains only to
claims based on defective design, and not to
those
based
on
defective
manufacture
or
inadequate warning.
The latter two raise
questions of fact to be decided by the jury.
Sliman, supra, 112 Idaho at 281, 731 P.2d at
1271
(on adequacy of warning) ; Farmer v.
International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 74849, 553 P.2d 1306, 1312-13 (1976) (on defective
manufacturer).
Toner, 112 Idaho at 328 n.9, 732 P.2d at 297, 308-09 n.9
1987) .
Comment

k

sets

out

a

risk

benefit

test

for

whether a prescription drug or any other product

(Idaho

ascertaining

is unavoidably

unsafe and therefore whether the manufacturer of such product is
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shielded from strict liability for injuries resulting from the use
of same.

See Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 780.

To demonstrate which

types of drugs should be excluded from strict liability analysis,
the authors of Restatement Section 402A and Comment k provided that
such an exemption should apply to drugs "whose harmful side effects
are

known

but

whose

benefits

Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 780.

far

outweigh

the

known

Comment k specifically

risks."

identifies

the Pasteur rabies vaccine as the type of drug whose benefits far
outweigh its known risks.
courts

faced

with

Seizing upon the example in the comment,

allegations

that

a

manufacturer

is

strictly

liable for injuries resulting from the use of vaccines have applied
the Comment k exception.

See,

e.g., Snawder v. Cohen, 749 F.Supp.

1473, 1476 (W.D.Ky.1990), and cases cited therein.

But see Ackley

v. Wveth

(6th

Laboratories,

(concluding
vaccine

that

under

is unavoidably

Inc.,
Ohio

law

unsafe

analysis) and Patten supra.

919

F.2d
the

397,
issue

is determined

400
of

whether

Cir.1990)
the

DPT

on a case by case

Similarly, courts have found blood and

blood products to be unavoidably unsafe, after proper analysis of
the

Comment

k

factors,

primarily

due

to

sustaining and life saving characteristics.

such

products

life-

See Miles Laboratories

v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107, 1117 (Md.1989), and cases cited therein.15

15
Applying Comment k immunity to prescription blood products
finds support in Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 363 (1965).
Justice Traynor, who wrote the seminal opinion adopting strict
liability in tort in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), identified blood
products as a classic example of unavoidably unsafe products.
Thus, the nearly blanket immunity from strict tort liability
received by blood and blood products arguably reflects the
influence of Justice Traynor.
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Other
category

prescription

drugs

do

not

of unavoidably unsafe drugs.

fit

so

neatly

Their utility

into

the

is not so

clearly superior to other drugs in light of their attendant risks.
Whether the benefits afforded by drugs other than rabies vaccine
and blood products, outweigh the risks associated with their use
and the availability of other safer products is a fact specific
determination traditionally reserved to a jury.

Plaintiffs submit

that this Honorable Court should so conclude.16
C.

Evidence Pertaining To All Risks And
Benefits From Any Drug Seeking Comment k
Protection. As Well As Such Evidence
Pertaining To Alternatives, Are Necessary
For A Proper And Complete Consideration Of
Comment k's Potential Applicability

Proper application of Comment k clearly requires a weighing of
the benefits of a product against

its risks and considers only

products which cannot be designed more safely.

The evidence must

address whether the risk is "unavoidable" as whether the product is
incapable of being made safe for its ordinary and intended usages,
which clearly implicates whether the design is as safe as the best
available testing and research permits.
"unavoidable

risks"

requires

that

Further, the element of

there

exists

no

feasible

16
In considering the constitutionality of a statutory cap on
damages, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that such a cap
would impermissibly interfere with the constitutional rights of
access to courts and right to a jury trial. Smith v. Department of
Insurance, 507 So.2d 1080, 1088-89 (Fla.1987).
Limiting recovery
to a particular amount results in denying an injured party the
constitutional
right
to
be
redressed
for
those
injuries.
Similarly, denying an injured party the right to have a jury
consider the merits of a cause of action denies that individual his
or her right as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution to have a jury
consider and resolve factual disputes about that cause of action.
Whether a product is unavoidably unsafe requires a factual inquiry.
Factual
inquiries
are
precisely
the
function
traditionally
preserved for juries.
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alternative design which on balance accomplishes the subject drug's
purpose with lesser risk.

Toner v. Lederle Labs, supra, 732 P.2d

at 305-306.

(cites omitted).

if

feasible

such

a

obviously

As recognized by the court in Toner,

alternative

is not unavoidable

or

design

existed,then

"apparently

the

reasonable";

risk
"[n]or

would the ^marketing and use of the [product] be fully justified'.
Consequently, Comment k by definition would not apply."
at

306.

The

issue

then

becomes what

does

the

trier

732 P.2d
of

fact

consider in making those determinations.
The

courts

applying

comment

k

on

a

case

by

case

basis

uniformly apply most if not all of the factors enunciated in Kearl
v.

Lederle

(1985),

Laboratories,

overruled.

(Calif.1988).

Brown

172
v.

Cal.App.3d
Superior

812, 218
Court,

Cal.Rptr.
751

The court should take evidence as to:

(1)
whether, when distributed,
[footnote
omitted] the product was intended to confer an
exceptionally important benefit that made its
availability highly desirable;
(2)
whether
the then-existing risk posed by the product
both was "substantial" and "unavoidable"; and
(3)
whether the interest and availability
(again measured as of the time of distribution)
outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced
accountability through strict liability design
defect review. In determining the first aspect
of the second factor (i.e., whether the risk
posed
was
"substantial")
a
court
should
consider whether, at the time of distribution,
the
risk
posed
permanent
or
long-term
disability
(e.g. loss of bodily functions,
organs or death) as opposed to mere temporary
or insignificant
inconvenience
(e.g., skin
rash, minor allergic reaction, etc.).
In
determining the second aspect of the second
factor
(i.e., whether the risk posed was
"unavoidable")
a
court
should
consider
(i)whether the product was designed to minimize
- to the extent scientifically knowable at the
time it was distributed - the risk inherent in
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P.2d

453
470

the product, and (ii) the availability - again,
at
the
time
of
distribution
of
any
alternative
product
that
would
have
as
effectively accomplished full intended purpose
of the subject product.
Kearl,

172

Cal.App.3d

original).
of

at

, 218 Cal.Rptr.at

464,

(emphasis

in

As further notfcd by the court in Toner, the evaluation

alternative

designs,

as well

as

the

subject

drug's

design,

should consider magnitude of the risk that the alternative product
avoids as well as the financial costs of the compared designs, the
benefits of the compared designs, and the relative safety of the
compared

designs,

including

would pose.

the

any

new

risks

that

the

alternative

Toner, 732 P.2d at 306*

Obviously,

for adequate and proper consideration of whether

defendant

has

persuasion

with

met

regard

its
to

affirmative
the

burdens

applicability

of

of

proof

Comment

k,

and
an

analysis of all risks incident to the use of the subject drug must
be considered.

In fact, as analysis of the potential risks of the

proposed alternative (which obviously are not at issue in the case
in chief) must of necessity be considered by the trier of fact in
balancing the evidence, any contrary holding would not only prevent
consideration of the relevant crucial evidence, but would further
permit the subject drug manufacturer to unfairly tip the scales in
favor of its product by urging numerous risks involved with the
proposed alternative while at the same time ignoring and avoiding
all counter balancing evidence of risks of its product.
is

truly

to

be

a

comparison,

due

process

and

its

If there

fundamental

notions of fairness require that the alternatives presented to the
trier of fact be on the same footing.
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The presentation

of such evidence during

the trial of the

action is clearly the appropriate and permissible method to allow
consideration of the affirmative defense of Comment k.

As held in

Graham v. Wveth Labs. 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir.1990), cert, denied
U.S.

, 111 S.Ct. 511 (1990), the district court's refusal to

hold a "mini-trial" (as contemplated by Kearl, supra,) outside the
presence of the jury constituted no abuse of discretion.

First,

the court noted that mini-trials can often result in "undue delay,
waste of time and needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Graham, 906 F.2d at 1406 n.10, citing Moe v. Avions & Arcel, 727
F.2d 917, 935 (10th Cir.1987).

Second, as negligent design defect

claims are not barred by even proven Comment k applicability, the
same evidence, of necessity, will be considered by the jury.
case where both theories of strict

"In a

liability and negligence are

alleged, the evidence from which the court must determine if the
product

is

unavoidably

unsafe

need

not

be

heard

outside

the

presence of the jury as it will be the same evidence from which the
jury will determine negligence."

Graham, 906 F.2d at 1406, citing

Judge Kelly's opinion in the case below, 666 F.Supp at 1498.
Finally, all of the evidence regarding any potential adverse
reactions, propensities, risks and dangers of a prescription drug
or

other

product

were

recognized

by

the

Utah

legislature

to

constitute appropriate, proper and admissible evidence under the
very statute previously argued by Upjohn.

Utah Code Ann. §78-15-

6(2) defines "unreasonably dangerous" to mean: "that the product
was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by
the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of that product in

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the

community

considering

a

product's

propensities, risks, dangers and uses

.... "

characteristics,
(emphasis

added).

Defect and unreasonably dangerous character have always been coexistent elements of strict liability actions, and the unreasonably
dangerous character of a product is separate and distinct from the
consideration of the defect proximately resulting in the injury to
the plaintiff.

This has been recognized by the Utah legislature as

well as by the court in Pollard v. Ashbv, supra.
the

defendant

drug

manufacturer

asserted

In the latter,

reversible

error

in

plaintiff's expert witness testifying about a potential danger of
the drug which was not the injury alleged by the plaintiff.

In

affirming, the court held:
[T]o prove the claim of strict liability
product defect, it was incumbent upon the
plaintiffs
to demonstrate,
not
only
that
chymodiactin caused his injuries, but also that
it was "unreasonably dangerous when put to a
reasonably anticipated use." [cite omitted]
The testimony of Dr. Sussman was relevant to
this point and was likely to be of help to the
jury.
Thus, there was no error. [cites
omitted]
Pollard, 793 S.W.2d at 401.
17 In Wolf bv Wolf v. Procter & Gamble Co., 555 F.Supp 613 (D.N.J.
1982) , the plaintiff had offered evidence reflecting
other
"problems" with Rely tampons as evidencing only notice, knowledge
and reckless disregard. The court neither mentioned nor considered
the admissibility of such evidence under the required showing of a
products "unreasonably dangerous" character. The Wolf decision has
not been followed for that proposition in any published opinion to
date.
Moreover, the very evidence excluded by the court in Wolf
was admitted in another TSS trial, and no error was found. Kehmn
v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.. 724 F.2d 613, 625-26 (8th Cir.1983)
Kehm has been followed, even in California.
West v. Johnson &
Johnson, 220 Cal.Rptr. 437, 174 Cal.App.3d 831, 59 A.L.R.4th 1
(1985), rev, denied (1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 824, 107 S.Ct.
96, 93 L.Ed.2d 47 (1986) (rejecting Wolf and following Kehm).
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Clearly,

such

evidence

is

admissible

in

strict

products

liability actions, and the need, propriety

and admissibility

such

present

evidence

is

especially

clear

in

the

case,

of

which

involves a pharmacologically active substance designed and intended
to alter and operate upon the central nervous system of the user,
wherein it is alleged that such drug induces a spectrum of central
nervous system disorders, manifested by a range of psychological
and

psychiatric

through

reactions

psychosis,

compulsion.

Such

from

aggressive
evidence

depression
assaultive

and

depersonalization

behavior

is admissible

and

homicidal

at the trial

of this

action not only on plaintiffs' strict liability claim but also on
all negligence claims and will be considered by the jury during the
trial of this case.
instructed

to

Clearly, that trier of fact should not be

disregard

such

whether Upjohn has properly

evidence
sustained

in

its

consideration

of

its burdens of proof and

persuasion and whether Upjohn has established that it is entitled
to

a

charge

unavoidably
liability.

on

its

pleaded

unsafe product

affirmative

exception

to the

defense,

i.e.,

the

law of strict tort

2

CONCLUSION
The clear public interest of the citizens of the state of Utah
favor enhanced accountability of product manufacturers not only for
increased safety concerns but also for the proper allocation of the
costs of defective products upon those who inject such products
into commerce for economic gain.

Adoption of Comment k to Section

402A runs directly contrary to those public policies.
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If adopted, this Court should join with the vast majority and
better reasoned authorities establishing that a potential Comment k
protection is an affirmative defense to be proven by the party
seeking its protection on a case by case basis.

Blanket and

absolute immunity as sought by Upjohn is contrary to the very terms
of Comment k, as well as to common sense.

For Upjohn to further

assert that strict liability should be eliminated in the state of
Utah

for

all

prescription

drug

manufacturers

based

upon

FDA

regulations is contrary to all authority, including that which
Upjohn urges this Court to adopt.

The safety, rights and remedies

of the citizens of the state of Utah should not be stripped from
them and deposited within the exclusive domain of an agency of the
United States government.
Proper application of Comment k necessitates extensive factual
determinations which are constitutionally and statutorily placed
within

the

domain

of

Utah

citizens

sitting

on

a

jury.

In

considering those appropriate factors, the jury will of necessity
hear the appropriate evidence regarding the Comment k affirmative
defense as part of the negligent design action,and it is clear that
the jury's decision on the affirmative defense of Comment k should
be based upon all relevant evidence.

To exclude any such evidence

would not only result in potential confusion but may well deprive
the appellate courts of the actual evidence necessary to properly
consider the acceptance or rejection of the affirmative defense in
any case.

It is respectfully submitted that this Court should

uphold, fully, the rights of the citizens of the state of Utah by,
if not rejecting Comment k in its entirety, applying that Comment
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as its terms dictate

and a

courts have held

and common

sense

requires.
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ADDENDUM

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION
ILO MARIE GRUNDBERG, individually,
and JANICE GRAY, as personal
representative of the Estate
of Mildred Lucille Coats,
Deceased,

'CERTIFICATION ORDER
TO UTAH SUPREME COURT

Plaintiffs,
VS.
THE UPJOHN COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation,

U.S. District Court
Civil No. 89-C-274G

Defendant.
Pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, this court acting sua sponte requests the Honorable
Supreme Court of Utah to answer the question of law certified
herein.

As more particularly set forth below, the question

certified is a controlling question of law in the above entitled
case, and moreover, it involves a significant public policy
issue.

The United States District Court which is certifying this

question has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over this
case, and the law of the State of Utah is the law to be applied.
The courts of the State of Utah, including the Utah Supreme
Court, have not previously addressed this question.

It is

believed that the question certified will not unduly interfere
with the Utah Supreme Court's regular functioning or be
inconsistent with the timely and orderly development of the
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decisional law of the State.

In accordance with the said Rule

41, the following matters are set forth as part of this
Certification Order*
1.

The question of law to be answered:

Whether Utah

adopts the "unavoidably unsafe products11 exception to strict
products liability as set forth in Comment k to Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)?1
1

Comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides:
Comment k. Unavoidably unsafe products*
There are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable
of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in
the field of drugs. An outstanding example
is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of
rabies# which not uncommonly leads to very
serious and damaging consequences when it is
injected. Since the disease itself
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both
the marketing and the use of the vaccine are
fully justified, notwithstanding the
unavoidable high degree of risk which they
involve. Such a product, properly prepared,
"" and accompanied by proper directions and
warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like,
many of which for this very reason cannot
legally be sold except to physicians, or
under the prescription of a physician. It is
also true in particular of many new or
experimental drugs as to which, because of
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
medical experience, there can be no assurance
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of
ingredients, but such experience as there is
justifies the marketing and use of the drug
notwithstanding a medically recognizable
risk. The seller of such products, again
with the qualification that they are properly
2
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Subouestion A: If Utah does adopt Comment k,
should FDA approved prescription drugs be deemed as a matter of
law to have satisfied the "unavoidably unsafe" prerequisite to
the Comment k exception, or should that determination be made on
a case by case basis?
Subouestion B: If Utah does adopt Comment k, and
if it is further determined that its application to FDA approved
prescription drugs ought to be made on a case by case basis, is
such determination a threshold question for the trial court, or a
question properly to be presented to the jury?
Subquestion C: If it is determined that Comment k
is to be applied to FDA approved prescription drugs on a case by
case basis, is evidence pertaining to adverse side-effects from
the drug which were are not alleged to have been personally
suffered by the plaintiff relevant to the "unavoidably unsafe"
determination?
2.

The question certified is a controlling issue of

law in a case pending before the certifying court, the United
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is
given, where the situation calls for it, is
not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequences attending their use,
merely because he has undertaken to supply
the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk.

3
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States District Court for the District of Utah, entitled, *
Grundberg v. UpJohn Co.. Civil No. 89-C-274 (assigned to Hon. J.
Thomas Greene).

The question certified arises in the context of

a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by defendant Upjohn that
has been fully briefed and argued and is currently under
advisement by the certifying court. Attached as Exhibit A to
this Certification Order is the Memorandum Decision and Order of
the certifying court which addresses related Motions for Partial
Summary Judgment.
3. There appears to be no controlling Utah law.
Utah adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts in Hahn v. Armco Steel Co.. 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah
1979).

However, Comment k to Section 402A has never been

addressed by the Utah Supreme Court, in the context of
prescription drugs or otherwise.
In Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court considered a drug product
liability case, but the court found that it was not necessary to
reach the strict liability issue because the court found that
there was sufficient evidence to support the juryfs verdict on
the negligence claim. Id. at 837. Also, certain Utah statues
address the liability of product and drug manufacturers, but
these statutes do not directly address these Comment k issues.
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-15-6(3)(1987) (rebuttable presumption
that product was not defective if manufactured according to
4
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industry standards); 78-18-2 (1990 Supp.) (punitive damagesunavailable if drug was approved by FDA).
In Patten v. Lederle Laboratories. 676 F.Supp. 233 (D.
Utah 1987), a case involving a DPT vaccine# the certifying court
predicted that the Utah Supreme Court likely would adopt Comment
k if given the opportunity, and accordingly held that Comment k
is the law of Utah to be applied.

Id. at 235. The court in

Patten specifically rejected the position that defendant Upjohn
urges here, and held that the "unavoidably unsafe" element to
Comment k immunity from strict liability for prescription drugs
should be determined on a case by case basis.
The "unavoidably unsafe" element of Comment k is that
the product in question is made in the safest possible manner and
that its benefits outweigh its inherent risks.

In its pending

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Upjohn does not argue that
factual disputes exist with regard to the unavoidably unsafe
requirement; rather# Upjohn takes the position that Halcion, like
all prescription drugs, satisfies this Comment k prerequisite as
a matter of law.
Defendant Upjohn argues that the courtfs holding in
Patten ought to be reconsidered in light of the California
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470
(Cal. 1988), which held that for reasons of public policy, all
FDA approved prescription drugs satisfy the Comment k unavoidably
unsafe requirement as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs, on the other

5
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hand# urge that the Patten decision is still in accord with'the
better position; i.e.. that a case by case determination should
be made regarding the unavoidably unsafe Comment k requirement.
Both parties agree that the other prerequisite for the
Comment k defense, that the drug "was properly prepared and
accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities/1 must be
established by the drug manufacturer in each case.
3.

States are divided on the question certified.

States are divided on the question of whether
prescription drugs should be deemed to be "unavoidably unsafe" as
a matter of law or whether this determination should be made on a
case by case basis (subquestion A certified).

See generally.

Annotation,"Products Liability: What is an "Unavoidably Unsafe"
Product, 70 A.L.R.4th 16, 41-47 (1989 & Supp. 1990).

Courts

supporting the view that all FDA approved prescription drugs are
"unavoidably unsafe" as a matter of law include: Lindsay v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 637 F*2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying
New York law); McElhanev v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 575 F.Supp. 228 (D.
S.D. 1983), a f f d . 739 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1984); Fellows v. USV
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 502 F.Supp. 297 (D. Md. 1980); Brown v.
Superior Court. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Kirk v. Michael Reese
HOSP.

& Med. Ctr.. 513 N.E.2d 387, 392-94 (111. 1987); McKee v.

Moore. 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v.
Chapman. 388 N.E.2d 541, 544-53^ (Ind. App. 1979); Leibowitz v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 307 A.2d 449, 457-59 (Pa. Super.
6
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1973).
Courts following the view that the Comment k
^'unavoidably unsafe" requirement should be made on a case by case
basis with regard to prescription drugs include: Graham v. Wyeth
Laboratories. 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'g, €66 F.Supp.
1483 (D. Kan, 1987) (applying Kansas law); Hill v. Searle
Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Arkansas
law); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981)(applying New Hampshire law); Allen v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 708 F.Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 680. F.Supp. 1293, modified, 695 F.Supp. 432 (D. Minn. 1988);
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories. 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987); Feldman
v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984); White v. Wveth
Laboratories. Inc.. 533 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1988); Castrincmano v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.. 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988); Gaston v.
Hunter, 588 P.2d 326# 340 (Ariz. App. 1978).

See also Note, A

Prescription for Applying Strict Liability: Not all Drugs Deserve
Comment K Immunization, 21 Ariz. St. L.J. 809 (1989).
There is also an apparent split of authority as to
whether the Comment k defense is a court or jury question
(subquestion B certified).
4.

See id. f 21 Ariz. St. L.J. at 819-20.

Facts relevant to the determination of the Question

certified:
Plaintiff Ilo Grundberg is the daughter of Mildred
Lucille Coats, who died at age 83, after being shot by plaintiff
7
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on June 19, 1988. The other plaintiff, Janice Gray, is the*
personal representative of Ms* Coats1 estate.

Plaintiffs allege

in their Complaint that Ms. Gnxndberg shot her mother as a direct
and proximate result of her ingestion of the drug Halcion, which
is a prescription drug manufactured by defendant UpJohn. Halcion
is used for the treatment of insomnia, characterized by
difficulty in falling asleep, frequent nocturnal awakenings,
and/or early morning awakenings. Halcion is the common or trade
name of the drug "triazolam" (generic name).
Triazolam was initially introduced into the world
market in Belgium in 1977. On May 4, 1976, Upjohn submitted a
new drug application to the United States Food and Drug
Administration (,fFDAw) to market triazolam (Halcion) in the
United States. The FDA approved Upjohn1s Halcion application on
November 15, 1982. Since that time, defendant Upjohn has
manufactured and distributed Halcion to pharmacies, hospitals and
physicians for dispensation by prescription only.

In 1988

Halcion was distributed by Upjohn in the State of Utah and
throughout the United States, and in more than 70 other nations
around the world.
Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Grundberg took a .5
milligram dose of Halcion on the day that she shot her mother,
and that this dosage was recommended by her physician and was
consistent with UpJohn1s recommended dosage.

Plaintiffs allege

that Ms. Grundberg shot her mother while in a state of Halcion
8
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(triazolam)-induced intoxication, which allegedly included many
side effects, such as depression, psychosis, depersonalization,
aggressive assaultive behavior and homicidal compulsion•
Plaintiffs1 Complaint states several causes of action,
including Common Law Negligence (Count I), and Strict Liability
(Count II), 2 In connection with these claims, plaintiffs allege
that defendant Upjohn knew or should have known that Halcion
caused the adverse side effects that were allegedly suffered by
plaintiff Gnindberg •

Plaintiffs further allege that Upjohn "did

not adequately design, synthesize, test, manufacture, and inspect
the Drug Halcion (triazolam),3 and willfully, recklessly, and/or
negligently failed or refused to give adequate instructions,
warnings and advice" regarding such side effects to plaintiff
Grundbergfs physician.4

Complaint 55 B.VIII, D.I., E.V.

2

Plaintiffs' other legal causes of action are set forth in Count HI, Breach of Expressed
and Implied Warranties (dismissed), and Count V, Wrongful Death. Counts IV, VI and VII are
damage claims,
3

At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs clarified that plaintiffs only claim that
Halcion was defectively designed by Upjohn. Plaintiffs do not claim that a "manufacturing
defect" occurred, ie., that plaintiff Gnindberg ingested a "bad batch" of Halcion or that
somehow a harmful ingredient was inadvertently made part of the specific Halcion pills that
were taken by plaintiff Gnindberg. Accordingly, allegations or references in the Complaint to
manufacturing defects, as opposed to design defect claims, should be considered stricken from
plaintiffs' Complaint.
A

Plaintiffs also alleged that Upjohn failed to give adequate warnings about Halcion to
plaintiff Gnindberg, plaintiff Grundberg's family, the public at large, hospitals and Pharmacists.
However, in connection with a prior motion for partial summary judgment filed by defendant,
the court dismissed all of plaintiffs* failure to warn claims except as they pertain to plaintiff
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Plaintiffs also allege that the dosage of Halcion recommended by
Upjohn and consumed by plaintiff Grundberg was excessive and
dangerous and was the proximate cause of the death of plaintiff
Grundbergfs motherr Mildred Lucille Coats*
5. Additional Reasons for Acceptance of this
Certification Order: The question and subquestions presented are
of major importance in products liability actions against drug
manufacturers•

The issues presented are matters of first

impression to the Utah Supreme Court and they are likely to recur
repeatedly in federal courts applying Utah law and in state court
proceedings also.

In terms of comity, this court believes that

the Supreme Court of Utah should be given the opportunity to
decide this matter of Utah law rather than having this court
address the matter in this diversity of citizenship case and
render an "Eirie guess."
A six week jury trial in this case is scheduled to
commence on April 29, 1991.
The necessary briefing relative to this matter has
already been done by counsel, and it is believed that counsel for
the parties would be in a position to stipulate to an accelerated
briefing schedule and presentation of arguments before the court.

Grandbergfs physician. See Order of March 11,1990, issued by Honorable Judge David K.
Winder who was previously assigned to this case. This ruling was an application of the "learned
intermediary doctrine" under Utah law. See Barson v. E.R. Souibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832,
835 (Utah 1984).
10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This court respectfully requests, if the Honorable
Supreme of Utah exercises its discretion to accept the question
herewith certified, that the court set forth in its order of
acceptance an expedited schedule for the filing of briefs and for
oral argument as contemplated in Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
DATED: December _[3_* 1990-

4

^k^ft^^utg^

yf THOMAS GREENE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION
ILO MARIE GRUNDBERG, individually,
and JANICE GRAY, as personal
representative of the Estate
of Mildred Lucille Coats,
Deceased,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Civil No. 89-C-274G

vs.
THE UPJOHN COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation,
Defendant.
This matter came on regularly on August 28, 1990 for
hearing on various motions of the defendant, the Upjohn Company
("Upjohn").

After extensive briefing by the parties and a day of

oral argument, the court took three motions under advisement: (1)
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs1
Strict Liability Claim; (2) Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs1 Failure to Warn Claims; and (3)
Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Ian
Oswald, M.D. Now, being fully advised, the court sets forth its
Memorandum Decision and Order with respect to these three pending
motions.

FACTUAL PAOygftOWP
Plaintiff Ilo Grundberg is the daughter of Mildred
Lucille Coats, who died at age 83, after being shot by plaintiff
on June 19, 1988.
The other plaintiff, Janice Gray, is the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

personal representative of Ms. Coats1 estate.

Plaintiffs allege

in their Complaint that Ms. Grundberg shot her mother as a direct
and proximate result of her ingestion of the drug Halcion, which
is a prescription drug manufactured by defendant UpJohn.

Halcion

is used for the treatment of insomnia, characterized by
difficulty in falling asleep, frequent nocturnal awakenings,
and/or early morning awakenings. Halcion is the common or trade
name of the drug "triazolam" (generic name).
Triazolam was initially introduced into the world
market in Belgium in 1977. On May 4, 1976, Upjohn submitted a
new drug application to the United States Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") to market triazolam (Halcion) in the
United States.

The FDA approved Upjohnfs Halcion application on

November 15, 1982.

Since that time, defendant Upjohn has

manufactured and distributed Halcion to pharmacies, hospitals and
physicians for dispensation by prescription only.

In 1988

c

Halcion was distributed by Upjohn in the State of Utah and
throughout the United States, and in more than 70 other nations
around the world.
Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Grundberg took a .5
milligram dose of Halcion on the day that she shot her mother,
and that this dosage was recommended by her physician and was
consistent with UpJohn1s recommended dosage.

Plaintiffs allege

that Ms. Grundberg shot her mother while in a state of Halcion
(triazolam)-induced intoxication, which allegedly included many
2
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side effects, such as depression, psychosis, depersonalization,
aggressive assaultive behavior and homicidal compulsion.
Plaintiffs1 Complaint states several causes of action,
but only the first two claims, Common Law Negligence (Count I)
and Strict Liability (Count II), are involved in the pending
motions.1

In connection with these claims, plaintiffs allege

that defendant Upjohn knew or should have known that Halcion
caused the adverse side effects that were allegedly suffered by
plaintiff Grundberg.

Plaintiffs further allege that Upjohn "did

not adequately design, synthesize, test, manufacture, and inspect
the Drug Halcion (triazolam),2 and willfully, recklessly, and/or
negligently failed or refused to give adequate instructions,
warnings and advice" regarding such side effects to plaintiff
Grundberg's physician.3

Complaint J5 B.VIII, D.I., E.V.

1

Plaintiffs' other legal causes of action are set forth in Count III, Breach of Expressed
and Implied Warranties (dismissed), and Count V, Wrongful Death. Counts IV, VI and VII are
damage claims.
2

At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs clarified that plaintiffs only claim that
Halcion was defectively designed by Upjohn. Plaintiffs do not claim that a "manufacturing
defect" occurred, Le., that plaintiff Grundberg ingested a "bad batch" of Halcion or that
somehow a harmful ingredient was inadvertently made part of the specific Halcion pills that
were taken by plaintiff Grundberg. Accordingly, allegations or references in the Complaint to
manufacturing defects, as opposed to design defect claims, should be considered stricken from
plaintiffs* Complaint
3

Plaintiffs also alleged that Upjohn failed to give adequate warnings about Halcion to
plaintiff Grundberg, plaintiff Grundbergfs family, the public at large, hospitals and Pharmacists.
However, in connection with a prior motion for partial summary judgment filed by defendant,
the court dismissed all of plaintiffs' failure to warn claims except as they pertain to plaintiff
3
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Plaintiffs also allege that the dosage of Halcion recommended by
Upjohn and consumed by plaintiff Grundberg was excessive and
dangerous and was a proximate cause of the death of plaintiff
Grundberg's mother, Mildred Lucille Coats.

DISCUSSION
I.

„:r..o^

Strict Liability Claim
A.

Overview

Defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Plaintiffs1 Strict Liability Claim requires consideration of the
application in Utah of Comment k to Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.

The specific issue presented in

defendant's motion is whether Halcion, as a prescription drug
approved by the FDA, should be deemed to have satisfied all the
prerequisites for the "unavoidably unsafe" exception to strict
liability as set forth in Comment k to Section 402A of the
Restatement.

Section 402A,and the Comment k exception state as

follows:
Section 402A. Special Liability of Seller of
Product for Physical Harm to User or

Grundberg's physician. See Order of March 11,1990, issued by the Honorable Judge David K.
Winder who was previously assigned to this case. This ruling was an application of the Earned
intermediary doctrine" under Utah law. See Barson v. E.R. Sauibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832,
835 (Utah 1984).
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Consumer.4
(1) One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies
although
(a) the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought
the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
. *

*

* ':

Comment_k. Unavoidably unsafe products.
There are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable
of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in
the field of drugs. An outstanding example
is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very
serious and damaging consequences when it is
injected. Since the disease itself
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both
the marketing and the use of the vaccine are
fully justified, notwithstanding the
4

Strict liability, as stated in Section 402A, applies only to users or consumers of
products. The Reporters "Caveat" to Section 402A states: "The Institute expresses no opinion as
to. whether the rules stated in this Section may not apply (1) to harm to persons other than
users or consumers...." Plaintiffs' Complaint ostensibly seeks recovery tinder strict liability for
both users (Ms. Grundberg) and nonusers of Halcion (Ms. Coats). Complaint I E.V. However,
the scope of Section 402A is not an issue in defendant's strict liability motion.

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

unavoidable high degree of risk which they
involve• Such a product, properly prepared,
and accompanied by proper directions and
warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like,
many of which for this very reason cannot
legally be sold except to physicians, or
under the prescription of a physician. It is
also true in particular of many new or
experimental drugs as to which, because of
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
medical experience, there can be no assurance
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of
ingredients, but such experience as there is
justifies the marketing and use of the drug
notwithstanding a medically recognizable
risk. The seller of such products, again
with the qualification that they are properly
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is
. given, where the situation calls for it, is
not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequences attending their use,
merely because he has undertaken to supply
the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk.
Restatement (Second^ of Torts § 402A, Comment k (1965).
In this diversity jurisdiction case the substantive law
of Utah applies.

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

Utah adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in
1979.

See Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah

1979) . However, Comment k to Section 402A has never been
addressed by the Utah Supreme Court.
In Patten v. Lederle Laboratories, 676 F.Supp. 233 (D.
Utah 1987), a case involving a DPT vaccine, this court stated
that the Utah Supreme Court likely would adopt Comment k if given
the opportunity, and accordingly held that Comment k is the law
6
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of Utah to be applied*

Id. at 235*

The court in Patten

specifically rejected the position that defendant Upjohn urges
here, and held that the "unavoidably unsafe" element to Comment k
immunity from strict liability for prescription drugs should be
determined on a case by case basis:5

a

Some courts have taken the view that
Comment K applies to all design defect claims
involving prescription drugs as a matter of
law. See, e.g.. Brown. 227 Cal.Rptr. at 772,
774; cf. Johnson. 718 P.2d at 1323. However,
as this court sees it, comment k does not
provide blanket immunity to all prescription
drugs. The language of the comment indicates
it is to apply to only "some" products. . . .
Prescription drugs are not necessarily so
designed that they cannot currently be made
safer, and sometimes there are more suitable
alternatives. Also, the benefits of
particular drugs do not necessarily outweigh
their discovered risks in every instance.
See Brochu, 642 F.2d at 655; Singer v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288, at 290-91
(1972). The court considers that extending
comment k protection to an entire class of
products would be unwise in light of the
requirements comment k specifies as
prerequisite to its application.

Id. at 236-37.

i.

Defendant Upjohn argues that the court's holding in
Patten ought to be reconsidered in light of the California
Supreme Court case Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal.
5

In its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Upjohn does not argue that no factual
disputes exist with regard to the unavoidably unsafe requirement fie, that Halcion is made in
the safest possible manner and that its benefits outweigh its inherent risks). Rather, Upjohn
takes the position that Halcion, like all prescription drugs, satisfies this Comment k prerequisite
as a matter of law.
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1988) , which held that for reasons of public policy, all FDA
approved prescription drugs are not subject to strict liability
as a matter of law.

However, in Patten. this court specifically

considered and rejected the California Court of Appeals decision
which the California Supreme Court affirmed in Brown.

676

F.Supp. at 236.
B.

Comment k and the "Unavoidably Unsafe11 Requirement

States are divided on the question of whether
prescription drugs should be deemed to be "unavoidably unsafe" as
a matter of law or whether this determination should be made on a
case by case basis.

See generally. Annotation, Products

Liability: What is an "Unavoidably Unsafe" Product, 70 A.L.R.4th
16, 41-47 (1989 & Supp. 1990).

The Brown decision of the

California Supreme Court appears to be the leading case in
support of the view that all prescription drugs are "unavoidably
unsafe" as a matter of law.

See also Lindsay v. Ortho

Pharmaceutical Corp.. 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying
New York law): McElhanev v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 575 F.Supp. 228 (D.
S.D. 1983), aff*d. 739 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1984); Fellows v. USV
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 502 F.Supp. 297 (D. Md. 1980); Kirk v.
Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr.. 513 N.E.2d 387, 392-94 (111.
1987); McKee v. Moore. 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982); Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541# 544-53 (Ind.
App. 1979); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 307 A.2d
449, 457-59 (Pa. Super. 1973).

But even in Brown, the California
8
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court acknowledged that members of the American Law Institute who
drafted Section 402A and its accompanying comments considered and
rejected language which explicitly exempted all prescription
drugs from strict liability.

751 P.2d at 475, citing 38 ALI

Proc. 19, 90-98 (1961); see also Hill v. Searle Laboratories. 884
F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989).

Courts that follow the view

that all prescription drugs are "unavoidably unsafe" as a matter
of law recognize that prescription drug manufacturers still have
the burden of establishing that the drug "was properly prepared
and accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities11 in
order to be immune from strict liability.

See e.g. Brown. 751

P.2d at 482-83.
The Tenth Circuit recently addressed the Comment k
••unavoidably unsafe" exemption in relation to prescription drugs
in Graham v. Wveth Laboratories. 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir. 1990),
aff•q, 666 F.Supp. 1483 (D. Kan. 1987).

Similar to this court's

Patten case, Graham involved a strict liability claim against a
DPT vaccine manufacturer.

The Tenth Circuit upheld the district

court^s interpretation that Kansas law required a case by case
showing by the drug manufacturer that the drug was "unavoidably
unsafe" in order for the manufacturer to be entitled to Comment k
protection from strict liability.

906 F.2d at 1405-06. Other

court decisions following the case by case approach include Hill
v. Searle Laboratories. 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989)(applying
Arkansas law); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 642 F.2d 652
9
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(1st Cir. 1981)(applying New Hampshire law); Allen v. G«D. Searle
i Co., 708 F.Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 680 F.Supp. 1293, modified, 695 F.Supp. 432 (D. Minn. 1988);
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987); Feldman
v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984); White v. Wveth
Laboratories. Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1988); Castrinanano v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988); Gaston v.
Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 340 (Ariz. App. 1978).

See also Note, &

Prescription for Applying Strict Liability: Not all Drugs Deserve
Comment K Immunization, 21 Ariz. St. L.J. 809 (1989).
C.

Certification to Utah Supreme Court

In the absence of specific direction from the Utah
Supreme Court on this issue since this court's Patten decision,
this court would be reluctant to overturn that decision, which
held that the Comment k exception to strict liability under
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is the law of
Utah to be applied, and that whether a prescription drug product
is "unavoidably unsafe11 should be determined on a case by case
basis.

However, the court recognizes that this issue is a

controlling question of law in this case, and moreover, it
involves a significant public policy issue.

States around the

country are not in agreement on this issue, and in this diversity
jurisdiction case where the law of Utah is to be applied, the
Utah Supreme Court has not had occasion to address this issue.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the court has
10
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determined, sua sponte, to exercise its discretion in certifying
this issue to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rule -41 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

See generally Lehman Bros, v.

Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974)(under appropriate circumstances
federal courts should exercise their discretion to certify
questions of law to state tribunal); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins.
Co.. 764 F.2d 876, 883-84 (D.C.Cir. 1985)(same).

Accordingly, an

Order of Certification is promulgated contemporaneously with this
Memorandum Decision and Order.6

II.

Failure to Warn and Inadequate Warning Claims
A.

Overview

Courts, commentators, and the parties in this case
appear to be in agreement that the adequacy of Upjohn%s warnings
6

The question certified is as follows: Whether Utah
adopts the "unavoidably unsafe products" exception to strict
products liability as set forth in Comment k to Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)?
Subquestion A: If Utah does adopt Comment k,
should FDA approved prescription drugs be deemed as a matter of
law to have satisfied the "unavoidably unsafe" prerequisite to
the comment k exception, or should that determination be made on
a case by case basis?
Subquestion B: If Utah does adopt Comment k, and
if it is further determined that its application to FDA approved
prescription drugs ought to be made on a case by case basis, is
such determination a threshold question for the trial court or a
question properly to be presented to the jury?
Subquestion C: If it is determined that Comment k
is to be applied to FDA approved prescription drugs on a case by
case basis, is evidence pertaining to adverse side-effects from
the drug which were are not alleged to have been personally
suffered by the plaintiff relevant to the "unavoidably unsafe"
determination?
11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

is decided on a negligence standard, even though this issue is
part of plaintiffs1 claim for strict liability as well as in
their claim for negligence.7

In other words, Upjohn had a duty

to warn physicians of adverse side-effects from taking Halcion
which Upjohn knew of or should have known at the time the drug
was manufactured and distributed.8

Courts have recognized that

a drug manufacturer's warning may be inadequate because of "its
factual content, its expression of the facts# or the method or
form in which it is conveyed."

Williams v. Lederle Laboratories.

591 F.Supp. 381, 384 (S.D. Ohio 1984), quoting Selev v. G.D.
Searle & Co. . 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981).

gee also Petty v.

United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1437 (8th Cir. 1984); Salmon v.
Parke. Davis & Co.. 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975); McEwen
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical. 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974).

The

court1s opinion herein pertains to all of plaintiffs warning
claims, both under the negligence cause of action and the strict
liability cause of action—except as to the warning issues
involved in defendant Comment k defense to strict liability,
which is a subject within the question certified to the Utah
7

See generally Patten v. Lederle Laboratories. 676 F.Supp.
233, 236 note 8 (D. Utah 1987); Werner v. Uoiohn Co.. 628 F.2d
848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980), cert, denied. 449 U.S. 1080 (1981);
Johnson v. American Cyanamid. 718 P.2d 1318# 1324 (Kan. 1986);
Henderson & Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability:
The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn. 65 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 265 (1990).
8

See generally Barson v. E.R. Souibb & Sons. Inc., 682
P.2d 832, 835-36 (Utah 1989); Restatement (Second^ of Torts §
402A# Comment j (1965).
12
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Supreme Court.

Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

on Plaintiffs1 Failure to Warn Claims seeks to limit the scope of
the evidence and issues at trial regarding plaintiffs1 warning
claims.
Defendant Upjohn argues that in this case the only
relevant evidence with regard to the adequacy of its warnings is
limited to those side effects which plaintiff Grundberg allegedly
suffered after taking Halcion and to which no warnings or
allegedly inadequate warnings were given.

In this regard, Upjohn

argues that adverse side effects which plaintiff Grundberg does
not allege to have suffered, and side-effects as to which
adequate warnings are undisputed, are irrelevant in this case and
that it would be unfairly prejudicial to have the jury consider
such evidence.
Plaintiffs oppose Upjohnfs motion by arguing that (1)
proper application of the learned intermediary doctrine and
"other legal and scientific principles11 imposes a duty upon
Upjohn to provide adequate warnings about all adverse side
effects of Halcion which it knows or has reason to know; and (2)
questions of fact exist regarding the side-effects which
plaintiff Grundberg suffered and the adequacy of Upjohn1s
warnings with regard to those side-effects. At oral argument,
plaintiffs also contended that evidence of unalleged side-effects
may be relevant to the "unavoidably unsafe11 requirement to the
defendants comment k affirmative defense to strict liability.
13
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The court has determined to defer this last aspect of the matter,
however, by providing an opportunity to the Utah Supreme Court to
resolve the Comment k issues that are being certified.
B.

Unalleaed Side-Effects

The court rejects plaintiffs1 first argument against
defendants motion to limit the warning claims. Without
question, a drug manufacturer has a duty to warn about all
adverse side-effects which it knows or has reason to know of at
the time the drug in question was manufactured.
8.

See supra note

However, this does not mean, ipso facto, that evidence about

all possible side-effects are relevant in a given case. This is
true because in a failure to warn case a plaintiff can only
recover for those injuries which were actually suffered.

The

learned intermediary doctrine does not dispose of the requirement
of proving causation or damages.9
The relevant parameters of a defendant's duty of care
in a particular case are limited by the facts pertinent to the
issues of causation and damages.

Plaintiffs in a negligence case

must establish a link, or proximate cause, between the injuries
they allegedly suffered and the duty they claim was breached.

9

See, e^fc, Barson v. E.R. Sauibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1984)
(recognizing learned intermediary doctrine and also requiring "that the conduct complained of
was the cause in fact of the injury"); accord. McKee v. Moore. 648 P.2d 21, 23 (Okla. 1982);
Dalke v. Upjohn Co.. 555 P.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1977); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Con)..
642 F.Supp. 652, 660 (1st Cir. 1982).
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Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). "Liability in
the air, so to speak, will not do." W. Prosser, The Law of Torts
325 (4th ed. 1971)# quoting Pollock, Law of Torts 468 (13th ed.
1929) • The court fails to see how admitting evidence regarding
Upjohnfs duty to warn about side-effects not alleged to have been
suffered by plaintiff Grundberg has any relevance in this case.
Discussing such duties and introducing such evidence could only
confuse and unfairly prejudice the jury.

See Wolf v. Proctor &

Gamble Co.. 555 F.Supp. 613 (D.N.J. 1982)(evidence of unalleged
drug injuries would only confuse the issues and cause jury to
"lose sight of the actual injury being litigated1').

Accordingly,

the court holds that plaintiffs1 failure to warn and inadequate
warning claims are limited in scope to the side effects which
plaintiff Grundberg alleges to have suffered.

Evidence relating

to adverse side-effects that plaintiff Grundberg has not alleged
to have personally suffered will not be admitted.
C.

Side-Effect Warnings j.n pjspute

What remains to determine is which adverse Halcion
side-effects has plaintiff Grundberg alleged to have suffered,
and of those that have been identified, which side-effect
warnings are adequate as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs first argue that the extent of the Ms.
Grundbergfs alleged Halcion caused side-effects is still an open
question, because plaintiffs contend that they are still in the
process of analyzing and determining the full extent of such
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side-effects.

Plaintiffs have not argued, however, that they

need more discovery on this issue.

Plaintiff Grundbergfs alleged

injuries occurred approximately two and a half years ago.

Trial

is set to commence in about four months and discovery is over
except for a limited number of unrelated expert witness
depositions.

Plaintiff Grundberg has had a continuing duty to

supplement her answers to interrogatories, and she has in fact
filed some supplemental answers.
One of the primary purposes of discovery is to identify
and narrow the issues for trial.

Plaintiff Grundberg1s answers

to questions presented in depositions and in answers and
supplemental answers to interrogatories has, as a matter of fact
and law, limited the scope of plaintiffs1 claims. The court
finds that plaintiffs have had sufficient time to identify those
adverse side-effects which they claim were suffered by plaintiff
Grundberg as a result of her ingestion of Halcion.

Plaintiffs

have no legitimate reason at this stage in the litigation to
claim that the extent of Ms. Grundberg1 s injuries and sideeffects from Halcion are still unknown.

Accordingly, the court

holds that plaintiffs1 warning claims are limited in scope to
those adverse side-effects which have been previously
specifically identified as having been suffered by plaintiff
Grundberg.
At the time this motion was submitted for decision,
plaintiffs claimed that Ms. Grundberg allegedly suffered the
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following fourteen specific adverse-side effects from taking
Halcion: (1) amnesia, (2) anorexia, (3) confusion, (4)
depersonalization, (5) derealization, (6) depression, (7)
inability to concentrate, (8) dry mouth, (9) paranoia, (10) mouth
sores, (11) panic, (12) voice changes, (13) oppressive assaultive
behavior and (14) homicidal compulsion.

Plaintiffs1 argue that

Upjohn's warnings with regard to the first seven of these
fourteen side effects were inadequate, and with regard to the
last six side effects, plaintiffs1 claim that no warnings were
given at all by Upjohn.

Defendant Upjohn seeks summary judgment

as to the first eight claimed side effects on the basis that
Upjohnfs language used could not reasonably be attacked as
inadequate as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs apparently have

conceded that Upjohn1s warning with regard to side-effect number
8, "dry mouth,w was adequate inasmuch as this side effect is not
mentioned in plaintiffs1 response memorandum nor in Dr. Oswald's
affidavit submitted as support of plaintiffs1 position.
The court has reviewed the memoranda of the parties, in
addition to relevant portions of the affidavits of Ian Oswald,
M.D., and Martin B. Scharf, Ph.D., submitted by plaintiffs, and
concludes that material questions of fact exist as to the
adequacy of Upjohn1 s warnings as to the following seven side
effects allegedly suffered by plaintiff Grundberg: (1) amnesia,
(2) anorexia, (3) confusion, (4) depersonalization, (5)
derealization, (6) depression, (7) inability to concentrate.
17
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Under all the facts and circumstances of this case, the court
concludes that material factual questions preclude a court
finding that Upjohn's warnings as to these seven side-effects
were adequate as a matter of law.

Thus, insofar as .defendant

Upjohn seeks summary judgment on these seven side-effect warning
claims, that motion is denied.

Defendant Upjohnfs motion is

granted with respect to the eighth side effect that was the
subject of its motion, "dry mouth.n

Plaintiffs1 failure to warn

claims regarding the remaining six alleged side-effects suffered
by plaintiff Grundberg (paranoia, mouth sores, panic, voice
changes, oppressive assaultive behavior and homicidal compulsion)
were not part of Upjohnfs motion and will be determined by the
jury at trial along with the first seven side-effect warning
claims.

III.

Motion to Strike
The affidavit of Dr. Ian Oswald was submitted by

plaintiffs in connection with their responses to defendant
Upjohn1s motions for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs1
strict liability and failure to warn claims.

Defendants Motion

to Strike Portions of Dr. Oswaldfs Affidavit is somewhat academic
in light of the courts ruling in Part II of this opinion.
Nevertheless, in the event that Dr. Oswaldfs affidavit will be
used in the future (except to the Utah Supreme Court as part of
subquestion C certified), defendant Upjohnfs Motion to Strike
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Portions of that affidavit is granted to the extent that the
affidavit as submitted refers to side-effects or warnings of
side-effects which the court has concluded in part II of this
opinion are no longer part of plaintiffs1 warning claims.

Based upon the foregoing,
(1) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs1 Strict Liability Claim is
STAYED pending final resolution by the Utah Supreme Court of the
Order of Certification.
(2) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs1 Warning Claims is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

The Motion is granted insofar as

plaintiffs1 warning claims are limited in scope to the sideeffects which plaintiff Grundberg has specifically alleged to
have suffered.

Unalleged side-effects are dismissed as part of

plaintiffs1 warning claims, as is the inadequate warning claim
regarding the alleged side-effect of "dry mouth."

Defendant's

Motion is denied insofar as it seeks to dismiss the warning
claims relating to the alleged side-effects of amnesia, anorexia,
confusion, depersonalization, derealization, depression and
inability to concentrate.

This decision does not pertain to

warning issues that may be involved in the "unavoidably unsafe"
determination in defendant's Comment k affirmative defense in
light of the pending Utah State Supreme Court certification on
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Comment k.

:
(3) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Motion to

Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Ian Oswald, M.D., is GRANTED.
Those portions of the Oswald affidavit that refer to Upjohnfs
warnings about side-effects that plaintiff Grundberg has not
alleged to have suffered are STRICKEN, as are any other
references to side-effects that plaintiff Grundberg has not
alleged to have suffered or that are not substantially similar to
side-affects that she alleges to have suffered as a result of
taking Halcion.

This Order regarding Dr. Oswald1s affidavit does

not apply to matters certified to the Utah Supreme Court in this
case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: DECEMBER

1 / , 1990.

J//TH©MAS GREENE
UWITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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